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My dissertation first studies the implication of household asset cross-holdings for con-
sumption risk sharing of US and Japanese households. Given the previous evidence that
finds income as a strong predictor of US households’ foreign stock holdings, I use income
level to divide households into groups with different probabilities to hold foreign stocks
and compare the groups’ consumption sensitivity to the deviation of their country’s GDP
growth from a global average, as a measure of consumption risk sharing. My result for
the two countries does not suggest that higher income households have a higher level of
international risk sharing.
Income is shown in the literature to be a positive predictor of US households’ stock
holdings, but there is no previous evidence that establishes the same relationship for
Japanese households. In Chapter 2, I further investigate Japanese households’ portfolio
choice by performing a logit regression. I show that income is a weak predictor of asset
cross-holdings, but total asset value, savings deposit, and business ownership are strong
predictors of Japanese households’ foreign stock market participation.
Chapter 3 focuses on a puzzle in previous studies on exporters’ pricing-to-market
behavior which have significant estimates that are out of the reasonable range. Based
on the latest theoretical development in the exchange rate pass-through literature, I test
if the estimates are improved when competition from exporters from competing countries
is controlled for. With imperfect measure in the control for competition, many out-of-range
estimates disappear. Exporters in different industries respond to competitor’s exchange
rate shocks differently, with those who produce more homogeneous goods more likely to
have a negative estimate.
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Chapter 1
Households’ International Consumption
Risk Sharing and Asset Cross-Holdings:
Evidence from the US and Japan
Abstract
This chapter studies the implication of household asset cross-holdings for consump-
tion risk sharing of US and Japanese households. Given the previous evidence that
finds income as a strong predictor of US households’ foreign stock holdings, we use
income level to divide households into groups with different probabilities to hold for-
eign stocks and compare the groups’ consumption sensitivity to the deviation of their
country’s GDP growth from a global average, as a measure of consumption risk shar-
ing. Our result for the two countries does not suggest that higher income households
have a higher level of international risk sharing.
1
1.1 Introduction
Consumption risk sharing is a natural implication of the Arrow-Debreu complete markets.
Agents, even when they are from different countries, can pool idiosyncratic and country-
specific risks by purchasing Arrow-Debreu securities and insure their consumption in the
cross-section. Cochrane (1991) points out that full insurance is important because it
implies the existence of a representative consumer used in many macroeconomic and
financial models.
Although it is implied by the Arrow-Debreu model, the effectiveness of asset cross-
holdings on international consumption risk sharing has not been fully studied in the lit-
erature. We attempt to answer this question by applying a modified version of the test
commonly used in the risk sharing literature (Lewis (1999) and Sorensen, Wu, Yosha,
and Zhu (2007)) to compare the consumption sensitivity to country-level shocks among
different groups of households according to their likelihood of holding foreign stocks. More
specifically, we regress different household groups’ consumption growth deviation from
the global mean on the shocks and compare the coefficients of the groups that are more
likely to be asset holders to those of less likely asset holders.
Traditionally, the biggest obstacle of such a test is the absence of household level
data with both asset holdings and consumption information. In the first part of this study,
we address this issue by using income as an asset holdings predictor and comparing
the degree of consumption risk sharing between households with different income levels.
We choose income as the predictor because first, as Nechio (2014) points out, income
has a significant and positive effect on both domestic and foreign asset holdings for US
households, and secondly, we have data with both income and consumption dimensions
for US and Japanese households. If asset cross-holdings can help households better
insure their consumption internationally, we expect to see a higher level of international
consumption risk sharing from households with higher income, as they hold more foreign
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and domestic assets, at least for the US households according to Nechio (2014).
The results from the regression with the US Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX)
do not support that high income leads to better risk sharing. On the contrary, we find that
the top income quintile of the US households exhibits the biggest response to country-
specific shocks, measured by the US GDP growth deviation from the G7 average. In
addition, we find that their high sensitivity is clearly driven by the consumption of durable
goods, once it is singled out from the total consumption. We perform the same analysis
on the Japanese households with Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) data.
The estimated responses are more accurate than those of the US households but again
we cannot find evidence of a positive relationship between income and consumption risk
sharing.
Two possible hypotheses can explain the puzzling discovery from the data: first, in-
come as a predictor for foreign asset holdings is not good enough, or secondly, income
is a good predictor, but foreign asset holdings are either inadequate or ineffective to com-
pletely insure against country-level shocks.
Nechio (2014) has established a positive relationship between income and foreign
asset holdings for the US households, therefore eliminating the first hypothesis for the
US. Our evidence shows that Hypothesis 2 is a strong possibility for the US households.
It is worth noting that Nechio (2014) only studies participation but not share of foreign
equity in the household portfolio. It is possible that they might be more likely to invest in
foreign assets, but their shares are not enough to insure against their higher exposure to
country-level shocks.
As far as we know, this chapter is the first to empirically investigate the effectiveness
of asset cross-holdings on international consumption risk sharing on a household level.
Existing studies that look at the impact of stock holdings on risk sharing are either limited
to a single-country world or purely on an aggregate country level. Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991) first argue that distinguishing between stockholders and non-holders is necessary
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to answer the equity premium puzzle, as the two groups demonstrate very different con-
sumption patterns. Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002) further endogenize the stock
holding decision and confirm the difference in consumption. Guvenen (2007) compares
the level of risk sharing between stockholders and non-holders and concludes that en-
trepreneurial income shocks cannot be easily hedged with stockholding. In a multi-country
world, Sorensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) discover that, from country-level data, over
time as equity home bias declines, consumption risk sharing increases. But no direct
connection has been made between foreign asset holdings and international risk sharing.
This chapter aims to contribute to the closing of the gap.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the literature
and introduces the methodology. Section 1.3 describes the data used in the regression.
Section 1.4 exhibits and interprets the regression results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature and Methodology
In general, households in open economies are exposed to global shocks, country-level
shocks, and idiosyncratic shocks. In Arrow-Debreu complete markets, they can insure
against the last two types of shocks by investing in foreign and domestic securities. When
all households only face the same global shocks, their consumption growth is equalized
and the households are said to have perfect consumption insurance1.
But in reality, consumption grows at different rates across households, and their de-
viation from the global average consumption growth might be attributed to country-level
and idiosyncratic shocks. Two fields of literature address the discrepancy between the
international implication of this theory and the data. International consumption risk shar-
ing literature documents the lack of consumption insurance between households from
different countries. Equity home bias literature investigates households’ preference for
domestic assets over foreign ones and implies that it might be the reason for the lack of
1See Obstfeld, Rogoff, and Wren-lewis (1996) for a textbook treatment.
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consumption insurance.
Consumption risk sharing literature focuses on whether households can effectively in-
sure against non-aggregate risks and can be broadly divided into domestic and foreign
branches. Many domestic consumption risk sharing studies focus on the US market, such
as Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Nelson (1994). These studies all concentrate on
testing whether US household consumption responds to idiosyncratic shocks. Under an
international setting, consumption risk sharing is examined by Backus, Kehoe, and Kyd-
land (1992, 1993), who discover that contrary to what the theory suggests, correlations
of consumption among developed countries are actually lower than correlations of output
and productivity. Many explanations for this puzzle have been suggested, such as leisure
(Backus et al., 1992) and nontradable goods (Stockman and Tesar, 1995).
One thing of the most importance that needs our special attention is that, in all of the
domestic consumption risk sharing studies, country level shocks are regarded as the ag-
gregate shock that cannot be hedged away; if a household’s consumption only responds
to country-level shocks, it is considered perfect risk sharing in the single-country set-
ting. But in an international setting, country-level shocks are themselves non-aggregate
that can be insured against through international asset cross-holdings; the fully insured
households in the domestic studies are not fully insured in a multi-country world.
The low level of international consumption risk sharing might be due to the lack of
international diversification in households’ portfolios; after all, if households do not trade
the contingent claims, risks will not be easily shared among them. In the equity home
bias literature, French and Poterba (1990, 1991) show that households tend to invest
very little in foreign stocks, therefore forgoing significant potential diversification benefit.
Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1991) discover that the lack of cross-border diversification is
common even for institutional investors. Various reasons have been suggested, such as
inflation risk and dead-weight loss2.
2See Lewis (1999) for an inclusive review.
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International consumption risk sharing and equity home bias are two of the six major
puzzles in international macroeconomics in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) and are inherently
linked. Lewis (1999), in her review of the two subjects, renames the former “consumption
home bias” to suggest its close relationship with the latter. Sorensen et al. (2007), using
country-level data, measure both international consumption risk sharing and equity home
bias over time, and suggest the former increases as the latter declines.
This study is related to both fields of literature. Our goal is to investigate, on the
household level, whether holding foreign stocks can effectively improve international con-
sumption risk sharing.
If one aims to compare the level of international consumption risk sharing among differ-
ent household groups, the group’s sensitivity to the country-level shocks can be captured
with the following specification:
∆ci,j,t −∆cA,t = θi + βi(∆yj,t −∆yA,t) + γiwi,t + ui,t (1.1)
where c and y stand for the log of consumption and GDP respectively, i stands for a
specific household group in country j, and A stands for the global average. Of the two
independent variables, ∆yj,t−∆yA,t is country j’s output growth deviation from the global
average, a measure of its country-specific shock. wi,t is the cyclical component of each
group’s income that controls for group-specific shocks. The dependent variable ∆ci,j,t −
∆cA,t is group i’s consumption growth deviation from the global average. θi is interpreted
as the group-specific long-run average of its consumption growth deviation from global
average. βi represents how much the group’s consumption growth deviates from the
global average when their country’s output growth leads or lags behind the global GDP
average. γi is group i’s consumption sensitivity towards group-specific shocks. ui,t is the
error term.
βi is of primary interest for our study as it represents the group’s consumption sen-
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sitivity to country-level shocks. International consumption risk sharing is rejected if it is
significantly greater than 0 as it means that the household is responsive to country-level
shocks.
Lewis (1999) and Sorensen et al. (2007) both have tests similar to (1.1). But there are
two key differences between our specification and theirs. First, their primary interest is
in comparing the consumption’s sensitivity to country shocks over time. As a result, they
pool all countries together and run a cross section regression each year to compare βt
for each t. They implicitly assume that at any point in time, every country has the same
sensitivity to country-specific shocks, but the sensitivity might change over time. The
second difference is that they do not control for the group-specific shocks represented by
the cyclical component of income and therefore the third term on the right hand side does
not appear in their specification. But for our purpose of comparing the level of risk sharing
between groups, Equation (1.1) implies that each group has the same response to the
shocks over the test period and βi’s are compared for different i’s.
Besides the total consumption, we further single out the consumption of durable goods
and compare it to the consumption of everything else. This first facilitates the comparison
with Mace (1991) in the domestic consumption risk sharing literature. In addition, due to
the special roles played by durable goods, there is a growing literature that investigates its
properties and effect on non-durables and portfolio choice both theoretically and empiri-
cally. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) have a very extensive review on durable
goods consumption in the life cycle. Examples of recent empirical study such as Brown-
ing and Crossley (2009) and Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013) focus on
how households change their consumption of durable goods differently than that of other
goods in respond to shocks.
In the Arrow-Debreu model, households share risks by purchasing contingent claims.
It would be natural to assume that households that participate in foreign equity markets
can better insure against country-specific shocks. If one seeks to measure the impact
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of asset cross-holdings on international consumption risk sharing, the ideal approach is
to randomly assign asset holding status to a sample of households and compare the βi
between the foreign asset holders and non-holders.
The difficulty of adopting such a straightforward method arises from the lack of house-
hold level data with both asset holding and consumption dimensions. For the US, the CEX
has detailed consumption information but does not distinguish between either stock and
bond holdings or domestic and foreign holdings. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) has detailed financial accounts for households and has a panel structure but only
includes food consumption. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) has a 3-year fre-
quency which renders statistical inferences powerless. Japan can be another example:
Japan’s FIES does not publish financial assets at all and Nikkei Radar survey only asks
questions on financial holdings.
With the SCF data from 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007, Nechio (2014) shows that in-
come level is a good predictor of both foreign and domestic equity holding. Therefore,
if indeed holding foreign assets helps household insure against country-level risks effec-
tively, higher income households should demonstrate a smaller response to such risks.
And since both CEX and FIES have consumption and income information, the finding in
Nechio (2014) suggests that income can be used to distinguish households with a higher
probability to hold foreign stocks from those with a lower probability. When households
are divided into groups according to their income, the higher income group is expected to
have a higher level of international consumption risk sharing than the lower income group,
since they are more likely to invest in foreign assets.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We use FIES database for Japan and CEX for the US in our study. The FIES is adminis-
tered by Statistics Bureau of Japan, and the bureau collects detailed household income
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and expenditure information, along with demographics. Every six months, a sample of
roughly 9,000 households is surveyed monthly to represent all but one-person student
households in Japan. Households are asked to keep records of daily income and expen-
ditures in a special-purpose account book. Unfortunately, micro-data is not available due
to privacy concerns. However, the bureau releases a tabulated dataset that reports the
average of income and consumption expenditures for each income quintiles. The quintiles
are divided based on each household’s annual income summarized at the end of each
households’ survey period. The aggregation of durables, nondurables, services, and to-
tal consumption is readily tabulated by the data publisher, and is directly adopted in this
study. Currently, we have quarterly data from 2002Q1 to 2014Q2.
On the other hand, the US data is much more detailed. The CEX is conducted by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics and contains information about income and the complete
range of expenditures of roughly 5,000 households that represent the entire US popula-
tion. The interview component of the CEX adopts a staggered rotating panel structure:
20% of the sample is replaced by new households every quarter and quarterly interviews
are distributed among each month. Each household is given five interviews. The first
interview is for baseline only and is not included in the data. In all of the four interviews
that follow, households are asked to provide all the expenditures in the three previous
months. But income information is only collected in the second and the fifth interviews.
The procedure might result in an out-of-sync income ranking and we need to take this into
account when we interpret the results. Each sample household in the CEX has a weight ω
that corresponds to the number of households in the US population the sample household
represents. The weighted average consumption can be calculated as
∑n
i=1 ωiCi/
∑n
i=1 ωi
for n households in the quintile at any point in time. The US data is available from 2001Q1
to 2014Q4.
To conform with the FIES income-consumption structure, households in the CEX are
divided into income quintiles and the quintile consumption is the weighted average con-
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sumption of all households in each quintile. Consumption levels from both countries are
adjusted for inflation with consumer price index (CPI) series from the International Finan-
cial Statistics database provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Consumption
growth is calculated as the first difference of the log of consumption levels.
For the global average output and consumption, we use the GDP and total consump-
tion series for G7 countries published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), as this is a group of large advanced economies with developed
financial markets. Country-level GDP and consumption series for the US and Japan are
obtained from the same database. As the OECD only publishes seasonally adjusted se-
ries, our group growth rates are also calculated after the consumption levels are stripped
off the seasonal component using STL decomposition by Cleveland, Cleveland, and Ter-
penning (1990).
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of US Household Consumption Growth Rates (%)
Min Max Median Mean St. Dv.
Total
Average -3.94 5.13 -0.08 0.00 1.73
Quint 1 -10.60 39.20 0.31 0.90 7.53
Quint 2 -9.62 7.71 0.05 -0.31 3.84
Quint 3 -6.68 5.12 -0.20 -0.16 2.88
Quint 4 -4.54 6.13 -0.25 -0.13 2.37
Quint 5 -7.10 5.38 0.43 -0.05 2.30
Durables
Average -26.41 15.87 -0.16 -0.65 8.09
Quint 1 -76.33 92.30 -2.37 0.39 39.50
Quint 2 -44.86 59.03 -1.57 -1.09 23.87
Quint 3 -49.99 39.11 0.82 -0.63 20.64
Quint 4 -40.34 31.40 0.96 -0.66 14.51
Quint 5 -28.60 23.45 -0.53 -0.85 13.19
Others
Average -2.30 6.00 -0.22 0.08 1.62
Quint 1 -8.04 36.69 -0.30 0.96 6.45
Quint 2 -6.58 6.41 -0.42 -0.23 2.84
Quint 3 -6.58 4.28 -0.25 -0.10 2.24
Quint 4 -4.35 5.16 0.29 -0.06 2.08
Quint 5 -4.61 5.36 -0.17 0.05 2.07
Note: Each series contains 55 quarterly growth rates from 2001Q2 to 2014Q4
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Several observations can be made from the summary statistics in Table 1.1. There is
a huge jump in consumption growth of the lowest quintile (Quintile 1). Their consumption
has a maximum quarterly growth of 39%, 92%, and 37% in “total”, “durables”, and “others”
categories, all of which are reached simultaneously in 2014Q1, when a large number of
high-spending households entered the lowest income quintile.
In Table 1.1, for total consumption, the highest earning households (Quintile 5) demon-
strate the lowest growth volatility. Also, from the negative and small positive means and
medians, the cumulative growth over the 14-year period for US households is very small,
if not negative. The growth for durable consumption is much more volatile, with the steep-
est drop reaches -76% in a quarter for the lowest-earning households. Again, the volatility
monotonically decreases as household’s income increases. The consumption category
“others” includes mainly nondurables and services, which are mostly recurring purchases.
So, it is unsurprising to see a lower volatility and a narrower range than the total consump-
tion. The volatility, once again, decreases as we move to higher income quintiles.
Table 1.2 describes the consumption growth of Japanese households. First, we see
the same volatility rankings among different consumption categories; durables consump-
tion is the most volatile, others the least, with the total in between. And again, the highest
earning households have the lowest volatility in durables consumption. But now both
the “others” and “total” categories have median households (Quintile 3) as the steadiest
grower. What is also notable is that every single mean is now negative.
There is no clear pattern in comparing Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in general. Compared
with their US counterparts, Japanese households have more volatility in total (2.01% vs
1.76%) and durables (11.52% vs 8.24%), but have a slightly smoother growth (1.63% vs
1.64%) in consuming everything else.
Table 1.3 summarizes the aggregate series. Immediately noteworthy is how low the
standard deviations are. The US and Japanese GDP growths are less volatile (standard
deviation 0.64% and 1.16% respectively) than any household group (including the total
11
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Japanese Household Consumption Growth Rates (%)
Min Max Median Mean St. Dv.
Total
Average -8.74 4.64 0.21 -0.24 2.01
Quint 1 -10.32 6.94 0.30 -0.19 3.89
Quint 2 -6.94 6.88 0.06 -0.27 3.03
Quint 3 -7.12 4.35 -0.45 -0.21 2.30
Quint 4 -9.02 6.31 -0.21 -0.31 2.82
Quint 5 -10.46 5.19 0.14 -0.20 2.76
Durables
Average -43.37 21.40 -1.27 -0.38 11.52
Quint 1 -68.99 60.15 5.55 -0.54 32.59
Quint 2 -47.82 46.06 0.92 -0.78 20.19
Quint 3 -40.41 50.76 -3.09 -0.62 20.19
Quint 4 -55.52 43.96 2.92 -0.29 18.58
Quint 5 -47.45 34.20 -3.47 -0.13 17.38
Others
Average -6.44 3.62 -0.12 -0.23 1.63
Quint 1 -8.08 4.67 0.15 -0.18 3.22
Quint 2 -5.88 5.57 -0.26 -0.24 2.65
Quint 3 -4.90 3.93 0.08 -0.18 2.04
Quint 4 -7.92 6.09 -0.07 -0.31 2.33
Quint 5 -7.31 4.16 0.00 -0.21 2.30
Note: Each series contains 49 quarterly growth rates from 2002Q2 to 2014Q2
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Aggregate Growth Series (%)
Min Max Median Mean St. Dv.
G7 GDP -2.27 1.09 0.49 0.34 0.60
G7 Consumption -1.07 0.94 0.42 0.39 0.37
US GDP -2.11 1.68 0.56 0.44 0.64
JP GDP -4.09 2.66 0.30 0.17 1.16
Note: Each series contains 56 quarterly growth rates from 2001Q1 to 2014Q4
12
Figure 1.1: Aggregate Growth Rates
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average) in any consumption category. And yet the G7 GDP and consumption are even
smoother. It is not difficult to imagine the deviations around the aggregate consumption
growth for the household quintiles. Also, all the means and medians of the aggregate
series are positive, compared to a generally negative pattern in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The
difference in volatility can be seen in Figure 1.1. Japanese GDP fluctuates the most
among the four aggregate series whereas G7 consumption is the smoothest. The three
GDP series are strongly correlated, more so after the Great Recession than before.
1.4 Regression Results
The Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test is applied to every series on both
the left- and right-hand side of Equation (1.1) and and stationarity cannot be rejected
for any series3. We apply a GLS regression with AR(1) residuals to account for serial
correlation. Regression coefficients are recorded in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. Also recorded
are each regression’s number of observation, Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the
log likelihood.
1.4.1 US households
Table 1.4 suggests some intriguing patterns of the US households. First, the appearance
of negative β’s is puzzling. Households in Quintiles 1, 2, 3, and 4 have negative responses
to US-specific shocks in at least one of the three consumption categories. Because of the
negative coefficients and for the sake of consistency, every significance in this section,
including that of the positive values, is based on two-tailed tests4. Due to the high standard
error of these estimates, the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient cannot be rejected in any
3Some series fail to pass the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, but their highest AR(1) coefficient is less
than 0.25. Therefore, in our case, the KPSS seems more appropriate.
4It is straightforward to convert the significance between one-tailed and two-tailed tests; the p-value in
a one-tailed test is simply one half of the p-value of the two-tailed test. Coefficients with one asterisk have
significance at 10% in a two-tailed test and 5% in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.4: US Consumption Risk Sharing Regression Coefficients
Coeficients Goodness-of-fit
Total Durables Others Total Durables Others
Average
Intercept -0.006*** -0.018** -0.004*** n 55 55 55
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
β
1.737** 7.850** 1.365** AIC -302.910 -122.100 -304.589(0.659) (3.473) (0.659)
γ 0.099 0.131 0.105 LogLik 156.455 66.050 157.294
(0.064) (0.348) (0.065)
Quint1
Intercept 0.003 -0.006 0.002 n 55 55 55
(0.011) (0.035) (0.011)
β
-0.986 -0.457 -0.780 AIC -135.161 44.462 -156.130(2.980) (15.258) (2.317)
γ 0.145*** 0.327** 0.142*** LogLik 72.581 -17.231 83.065
(0.035) (0.128) (0.033)
Quint2
Intercept -0.006* -0.013 -0.005 n 55 55 55
(0.003) (0.018) (0.003)
β
-0.090 1.725 -0.136 AIC -214.767 -20.393 -237.637(1.484) (8.381) (1.252)
γ 0.184*** 0.502 0.158*** LogLik 112.384 15.197 123.819
(0.055) (0.305) (0.052)
Quint3
Intercept -0.006* -0.004 -0.006** n 55 55 55
(0.003) (0.017) (0.003)
β
0.593 -5.480 1.353 AIC -238.116 -28.763 -264.610(1.208) (7.729) (0.969)
γ 0.157** 0.349 0.154** LogLik 124.058 19.382 137.305
(0.065) (0.395) (0.059)
Quint4
Intercept -0.006** -0.019 -0.004** n 55 55 55
(0.003) (0.017) (0.002)
β
0.640 9.580 -0.202 AIC -253.334 -53.580 -277.453(1.066) (6.559) (0.825)
γ 0.088 0.448 0.059 LogLik 131.667 31.790 143.726
(0.105) (0.648) (0.075)
Quint5
Intercept -0.007*** -0.024** -0.005** n 55 55 55
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
β
2.229** 12.882** 1.303 AIC -275.464 -82.236 -272.187(0.842) (4.870) (0.909)
γ 0.082 0.348 0.060 LogLik 142.732 46.118 141.094
(0.093) (0.540) (0.104)
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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of the negative cases.
A striking revelation is that our evidence does not agree with the expectation of “more
income, more foreign asset, therefore more risk sharing”. US households demonstrate
the opposite pattern, with risk sharing rejected only for the highest earning households
at 5% level. Their total consumption’s high sensitivity is largely driven by the durables
consumption, which exceeds G7 average by almost 13% when US GDP leads G7 GDP by
1%. Recall from the last section that the highest earning US households have the lowest
volatility in both total and durables consumption. The regression coefficients show that
even though the highest quintile households’ total and durables consumption growths do
not fluctuate as much as those of other households, the fluctuation synchronizes with US-
specific shocks to a very high degree. The overall rejection of risk sharing for an average
US household’s total consumption (1.737 with significance at 1%) is largely attributed to
the high sensitivity of the highest quintile, which in turn is driven by its tremendously high
sensitivity in durables consumption.
Also, an average US households’ sensitivity to US-specific shocks is higher in durables
consumption than in other consumption (7.850 vs 1.737, both at two-tailed 5%). This is
in drastic contrast with Mace (1991) who rejects risk sharing for nondurables but not for
durables. But this contrast does not necessarily mean contradiction, as the definition of
“aggregate shock” is different under different settings. Mace (1991) implicitly views the US
as the only economy and investigates if US households can insure against idiosyncratic
shocks (i.e. job loss, injury, etc.). In that universe, synchronizing one’s consumption with
country-level shocks is considered effective risk sharing, as those shocks are the top-
level aggregate shocks. The evidence that US durables consumption highly correlates
with US country-level shocks is interpreted as in favor of effective risk sharing in the
US-only universe. But in a global context, country level shocks are now one of the “non-
aggregate” shocks one seeks to hedge against whereas the global shocks (shocks to
G7 average GDP in our particular case) is the new “aggregate”. The high correlation is
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now proof against effective international risk sharing among households from different
countries.
We can interpret durables’ high sensitivity towards country-level shocks as one of
households’ mechanisms of achieving smoother consumption in other goods. House-
holds only buy cars and home appliances when the country’s economy is doing well and
stick to their older existing ones otherwise, so that their consumption of everyday goods
and services can be relatively smoother. The difference of standard deviations of durables
and others in Table 1.1 may be the result of this consumption behavior.
The income coefficients γ, on the other hand, do not raise contradiction to our expec-
tations as the β’s. For the total consumption, the lower four quintiles significantly respond
to their respective income shocks at the 0.27 to 0.46 range, while we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the highest earning households are relatively immune to change in income.
Note that the intercepts for all the regressions are consistently negative, though of
various significance. This suggests that in the long run, the US consumption grows at a
slower pace than the global average.
Nechio (2014) has established the positive predictive power of income level on for-
eign asset holdings for US households. But the evidence raises the question why more
foreign asset participation cannot improve international consumption insurance. It might
be that asset cross-holdings are not effective risk sharing mechanisms, contrary to what
the theory suggests. Another possible explanation is that the highest income households
have the highest exposure to country-level shocks to begin with. Parker and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2009) show that higher earning households disproportionately bear more of
the country risks. In addition, the results of Nechio (2014) also suggest that the high-
est earning households have the highest probability of owning domestic stocks, so they
might be more exposed to US-specific risks through owning either more US stocks or US
businesses. Future studies on international consumption risk sharing need to consider
measuring the various levels of exposure, as it may require a smaller or larger share of
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foreign stock holdings to insure.
1.4.2 Japanese Households
In Table 1.5, the 3rd quintile exhibits the lowest sensitivity to Japanese country shocks for
total consumption. Again, recall from the last section that the median Japanese house-
holds have the lowest volatility in total consumption. Now they are shown to have the
lowest sensitivity to country-level shocks. This suggests that even though they all fail to
insure consumption effectively, the median households respond to country shocks to the
smallest degree. Meanwhile, Quintile 2 has the highest sensitivity to country-level shocks
in all consumption categories. Similar to the highest earning US households, Quintile 5
here is also has a very high response to country-level shocks in durables consumption.
The driving force of durables consumption is even more produced in Quintile 2.
The Japanese households can overall hedge against group-specific shocks relatively
well except for the lowest two quintiles. And for the lower earning households, their sen-
sitivity mainly come from their consumption other than durable goods; it is possible that
they cannot afford to use durables as a way to smooth out nondurable consumption due
to their low income.
Again, the evidence suggests that the highest earning households are not doing any
better in insuring against country-level risks. Like in the US case, it is possibly due to their
higher exposure to the Japanese country shocks, but on the other hand, unlike in the US
case where Nechio (2014) confirms the predictive power of income on asset holdings,
income’s effect on Japanese households’ asset holding is open to question, which is
answered in Chapter 2.
1.4.3 Alternative specification without income component
As mentioned in Section 1.2, a commonly used specification (Lewis, 1999; Sorensen
et al., 2007) does not account for the group-specific income component in Equation (1.1).
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Table 1.5: Japanese Consumption Risk Sharing Regression Coefficients
Coeficients Goodness-of-fit
Total Durables Others Total Durables Others
Average
Intercept -0.004*** 0.003 -0.005*** n 49 49 49
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
β
0.876*** 6.254*** 0.617*** AIC -272.341 -88.698 -283.629(0.221) (1.537) (0.205)
γ 0.238* 0.582 0.211 LogLik 141.170 49.349 146.815
(0.133) (0.980) (0.127)
Quint1
Intercept -0.004 0.003 -0.005 n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.027) (0.003)
β
1.008* 7.778* 0.729 AIC -188.649 20.087 -204.484(0.555) (4.620) (0.476)
γ 0.450* 0.965 0.436** LogLik 99.325 -5.044 107.242
(0.245) (2.020) (0.212)
Quint2
Intercept -0.004 0.004 -0.005** n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.021) (0.002)
β
1.674*** 11.810*** 1.110*** AIC -220.077 -26.188 -228.907(0.427) (3.104) (0.386)
γ 0.866*** 2.949 0.746*** LogLik 115.039 18.094 119.453
(0.296) (2.256) (0.262)
Quint3
Intercept -0.004** -0.002 -0.004** n 49 49 49
(0.002) (0.020) (0.002)
β
0.836** 3.397 0.639** AIC -238.247 -17.555 -251.970(0.339) (3.212) (0.292)
γ 0.367 2.240 0.264 LogLik 124.124 13.778 130.985
(0.237) (2.241) (0.201)
Quint4
Intercept -0.004** 0.001 -0.005*** n 49 49 49
(0.002) (0.015) (0.002)
β
1.249*** 4.798* 1.040*** AIC -230.293 -35.918 -249.315(0.353) (2.590) (0.289)
γ 0.319 1.159 0.270 LogLik 120.146 22.959 129.658
(0.219) (1.622) (0.179)
Quint5
Intercept -0.004 0.007 -0.005** n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.017) (0.002)
β
0.921** 7.609*** 0.413 AIC -218.976 -37.708 -234.209(0.425) (2.708) (0.361)
γ 0.064 -0.409 0.092 LogLik 114.488 23.854 122.104
(0.169) (1.089) (0.142)
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 1.6: US Risk Sharing Regression w/o Income component
Coeficients Goodness-of-fit
Total Durables Others Total Durables Others
Average
Intercept -0.006*** -0.019** -0.005*** n 55 55 55
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) AIC -302.454 -123.951 -303.998
β 1.662** 7.800** 1.272* LogLik 155.227 65.976 155.999
(0.665) (3.442) (0.664)
Quint1
Intercept 0.006 -0.006 0.007 n 55 55 55
(0.012) (0.038) (0.012) AIC -121.708 48.961 -141.353
β -1.197 4.324 -1.443 LogLik 64.854 -20.480 74.677
(3.388) (15.964) (2.720)
Quint2
Intercept -0.005 -0.012 -0.005 n 55 55 55
(0.004) (0.019) (0.003) AIC -206.576 -19.630 -230.812
β -1.486 -2.537 -0.986 LogLik 107.288 13.815 119.406
(1.576) (8.163) (1.309)
Quint3
Intercept -0.006* -0.005 -0.006** n 55 55 55
(0.003) (0.017) (0.003) AIC -234.454 -29.951 -259.835
β 0.174 -6.867 0.955 LogLik 121.227 18.976 133.918
(1.249) (7.559) (1.005)
Quint4
Intercept -0.006** -0.019 -0.004** n 55 55 55
(0.003) (0.016) (0.002) AIC -254.592 -55.078 -278.799
β 0.496 8.845 -0.307 LogLik 131.296 31.539 143.399
(1.049) (6.437) (0.812)
Quint5
Intercept -0.007*** -0.024** -0.005** n 55 55 55
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) AIC -276.660 -83.801 -273.839
β 2.038** 12.064** 1.164 LogLik 142.330 45.900 140.920
(0.811) (4.674) (0.870)
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 1.7: Japanese Risk Sharing Regression w/o Income Component
Coeficients Goodness-of-fit
Total Durables Others Total Durables Others
Average
Intercept -0.004*** 0.003 -0.005*** n 49 49 49
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) AIC -271.188 -90.330 -282.861
β 0.940*** 6.361*** 0.668*** LogLik 139.594 49.165 145.430
(0.229) (1.523) (0.210)
Quint1
Intercept -0.004 0.003 -0.004 n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.027) (0.003) AIC -187.226 18.322 -202.200
β 0.888 7.482 0.628 LogLik 97.613 -5.161 105.100
(0.562) (4.543) (0.488)
Quint2
Intercept -0.004 0.003 -0.005* n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.020) (0.002) AIC -213.791 -26.445 -222.984
β 1.333*** 10.730*** 0.809** LogLik 110.895 17.222 115.492
(0.440) (3.026) (0.398)
Quint3
Intercept -0.004** -0.003 -0.005** n 49 49 49
(0.002) (0.020) (0.002) AIC -237.791 -18.520 -252.166
β 0.812** 3.151 0.618** LogLik 122.895 13.260 130.083
(0.344) (3.216) (0.294)
Quint4
Intercept -0.005** 0.001 -0.005*** n 49 49 49
(0.002) (0.015) (0.002) AIC -230.132 -37.381 -249.010
β 1.290*** 4.887* 1.076*** LogLik 119.066 22.690 128.505
(0.360) (2.580) (0.296)
Quint5
Intercept -0.004 0.006 -0.005** n 49 49 49
(0.003) (0.016) (0.002) AIC -220.826 -39.558 -235.768
β 0.961** 7.370*** 0.471 LogLik 114.413 23.779 121.884
(0.410) (2.611) (0.350)
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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For robustness check, we drop our income variable as well. The results are reported in
Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
All the significant β estimates in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 remain significant in Tables 1.6
and 1.7, and have very similar values. The disconnect between income and international
risk sharing is still apparent in both the US and Japanese households.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In order to look into the relationship between asset cross-holdings and international con-
sumption risk sharing, we investigate the level of consumption insurance between house-
holds with different income levels, using income as an indicator for the probability of for-
eign asset holdings. Although Nechio (2014) claims the positive relationship between
income and foreign asset holding, our analysis shows that the highest-earning US house-
holds have the lowest level of international consumption insurance. This suggests that
asset cross-holdings are either inadequate at the current level or ineffective. Either high-
est earners might bear more country-level risks and need a greater share of foreign assets
in their household portfolio to hedge the risk, or asset holdings itself is not as effective in
risk sharing as suggested by the theory. Future studies on consumption risk sharing need
to start with measuring the different exposure to the shocks for different households, and
consider its relationship with the necessary level of foreign stock holdings.
On the other hand, Japanese households’ income–risk sharing relationship is more
complicated and puzzling. While risk sharing is rejected for all but the lowest income
quintile, the median households show the lowest sensitivity to Japan-specific shocks. Un-
like in the case of the US households with Nechio (2014) establishing income as a reliable
predictor for asset holdings, we cannot be certain for the Japanese households whether
the lack of relationship between income and risk sharing is due to income’s poor predictive
power or it is because asset cross-holdings are not an effective consumption insurance
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mechanism.
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Chapter 2
Japanese Households’ Asset Holding
Decision
Abstract
Evidence in Chapter 1 does not support any positive relationship between income
and international consumption risk sharing. In this chapter, we further investigate
Japanese households’ portfolio choice by performing a logit regression. We show that
income is a weak predictor of asset cross-holdings. The regression also suggests
total asset value, savings deposit, and business ownership as strong predictors of
Japanese households’ foreign stock market participation.
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2.1 Introduction
In comparison to the extensive literature of US households’ asset participation decision,
Japanese households’ asset participation decision is not as fully studied. Iwaisako (2009)
provides a detailed and valuable investigation of Japanese household portfolio decisions
but the study is mostly descriptive and does not consider income. We provide an investi-
gation of Japanese households’ portfolio decision by performing a logit model on the 2013
dataset from the Nikkei Radar database.
Recall from Chapter 1 that if the evidence fails to establish a positive relationship
between income level and international consumption risk sharing, there are two possible
explanations: first, income as a predictor for foreign asset holdings is not good enough
(henceforth Hypothesis 1), or secondly, income is a good predictor, but foreign asset
holdings are either inadequate or ineffective to completely insure against country-level
shocks (Hypothesis 2).
Our evidence from the logit model confirms Hypothesis 1 for Japanese households;
unlike the US, income is not a good predictor of Japanese households’ foreign asset hold-
ings. But income is a strong predictor of direct domestic stock holdings. We also discover
that generally speaking, unsurprisingly, total asset value reliably predicts asset holdings
of any kind (both domestic and foreign, bond and equity). Age helps positively predict do-
mestic bond and equity holdings but not so much for foreign ones. Homeownership has
a positive and significant effect on both domestic and foreign stock holdings but is power-
less in predicting either bond holding, and female household heads seem to demonstrate
an aversion of stock investing of any kind. Most interesting is the discovery that employers
like to directly invest in foreign stocks but at the same time dislike domestic stocks.
When Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for Japanese households, we cannot make
any conjecture on the second one. Our logit model reveals several predictors of foreign
asset holding decision for Japanese households and this can be helpful for future studies
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to perform a test of international consumption risk sharing with endogenous foreign asset
holding decision.
The next two sections describe the dataset and the methodology. Section 2.4 sum-
marizes the data. Regression results are listed and interpreted in Section 2.5. After the
robustness check in Section 2.6, we conclude.
2.2 Data
We use the data from the Nikkei Radar database. Nikkei Radar annually documents
detailed cross-sectional portfolio choice from 1,500 to 2,700 households sampled from the
five prefectures around the Tokyo metropolitan area. The most attractive feature is that, as
far as we know, it is the only Japanese database that distinguishes both between domestic
and foreign assets and between direct and indirect holdings. It is a repeated cross section
and we are using the 2013 data. The focus on the five out of the 47 prefectures in all of
Japan means an over-representation of urban households and an under-representation of
rural ones. Iwaisako (2003) compares the household characteristics of Nikkei Radar with
other datasets and concludes that it represents the overall population well. We have the
asset holding status for the year 2013 along with the 2,680 households’ age, occupation,
gender of the head, income, and total value of assets. All the asset holding information
that we have is binary; we know whether a household holds a particular asset but not the
exact amount. The amounts of income and asset holdings are censored into brackets.
2.3 Specification and Methodology
We apply a logit model to investigate a household’s portfolio decision. Along with the
validity of using income as a proxy for foreign asset holding, we also investigate other
possible elements that affect household portfolio choice. For example, Iwaisako (2009)
reports that a household’s stock market participation decision is heavily influenced by their
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home ownership status because of the unique Japanese housing market regulations. The
logit model can evaluate this hypothesis by including the ownership of both residential
and commercial land as regressors. Age, gender, income, and asset are also included.
Investing in safe assets such as savings account, and the existence of outstanding debt
and mortgage the household needs to pay down could influence portfolio decisions as
well. Other predictors are also considered, such as the employment status.
Besides the foreign stocks, other categories of financial assets are also considered
for comparison, such as domestic stocks, foreign bonds, and domestic bonds. We also
combine domestic and foreign stocks into “all stocks” category to represent investing in
either one of the two markets. “All bonds” category is its counterpart for domestic and
foreign bonds. For each asset category, we further divide the holdings into direct holdings,
holdings through funds, and either of the two.
Some statistical difficulties arise due to the format and property of the dataset. Be-
cause the amounts of income and asset are censored, we cannot use them as numerical
variables. Instead, we turn them into quintiles, which conforms with our exercise in Chap-
ter 1. Also, due to the relatively small number of households who hold foreign assets, the
issues of complete separation and rare event both could potentially bias the estimate. For
this reason, we apply penalized likelihood method introduced by Firth (1993).
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 summarizes the percentage of households in each quintile who
are holders of a particular asset class. The averages over all households in the sample
are replicated in the first column of every table for comparison with the broken-down per-
centages. From the entire sample, we can see that domestic stocks, including both direct
and indirect holdings, are the most popular investment in financial assets, at 34.93%, far
more than any other financial category. 35.86% hold at least one kind of stock, either di-
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Table 2.1: Share of Households Holding Assets by Each Asset Quintile
All Asset Quintiles
Households Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
A. Asset Classes (%)
Foreign Stock Direct 4.55 1.54 3.28 4.62 7.33 12.54
Foreign Stock Fund 9.85 0.86 5.81 8.67 17.03 30.75
Foreign Stock Direct/Fund 12.91 2.40 8.84 12.14 21.98 36.72
Foreign Bond Direct 14.93 3.42 10.10 15.03 24.18 40.30
Foreign Bond Fund 9.25 1.20 3.79 7.80 16.67 30.15
Foreign Bond Direct/Fund 19.51 4.45 12.63 19.94 32.23 53.13
Domestic Stock Direct 31.98 14.90 29.55 37.28 48.35 66.87
Domestic Stock Fund 11.01 2.40 5.56 9.83 18.68 34.03
Domestic Stock Direct/Fund 34.93 16.10 31.06 42.20 53.30 73.13
Domestic Bond Direct 10.11 2.41 5.58 7.02 16.76 33.84
Domestic Bond Fund 7.35 1.03 2.53 6.36 12.82 25.07
Domestic Bond Direct/Fund 15.19 2.93 7.61 12.87 26.34 48.64
All Stock Direct 32.57 15.24 30.30 38.44 49.08 67.46
All Stock Fund 12.72 2.40 7.58 11.27 21.25 38.81
All Stock Direct/Fund 35.86 16.44 32.32 43.35 54.76 73.73
All Bond Direct 21.54 5.69 14.47 20.76 36.10 57.40
All Bond Fund 9.74 1.54 3.79 8.09 17.40 31.94
All Bond Direct/Fund 25.00 6.72 16.75 25.73 41.80 65.56
Savings Deposit 10.94 2.58 3.80 12.50 16.73 35.03
Residential Property 63.54 52.78 66.92 66.28 74.40 84.19
Commercial Land 7.81 3.47 4.87 7.62 13.17 18.54
Paid Off Mortgage 66.47 54.73 52.15 64.33 75.51 87.99
No Other Debt 93.10 88.53 93.18 93.06 96.34 98.81
Real Estate Investment Trust 3.06 0.34 1.26 1.73 5.13 11.34
B. Household Characteristics
Number of Households 2680 584 396 346 546 335
Average Age 50.67 44.68 48.70 52.45 55.08 60.65
Share of Married Households (%) 81.12 80.14 84.60 83.82 84.80 85.07
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Table 2.2: Share of Households Holding Assets by Each Income Quintile
All Income Quintiles
Households Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
A. Asset Classes (%)
Foreign Stock Direct 4.55 4.36 2.84 3.98 5.51 8.04
Foreign Stock Fund 9.85 7.80 9.48 8.68 9.38 17.86
Foreign Stock Direct/Fund 12.91 11.70 11.06 11.75 13.05 22.02
Foreign Bond Direct 14.93 10.32 10.90 16.09 14.34 30.65
Foreign Bond Fund 9.25 8.94 7.90 8.68 8.46 16.07
Foreign Bond Direct/Fund 19.51 15.37 15.96 20.98 18.20 35.71
Domestic Stock Direct 31.98 22.25 27.33 32.19 37.50 53.87
Domestic Stock Fund 11.01 9.17 9.79 10.31 9.56 21.73
Domestic Stock Direct/Fund 34.93 25.23 29.86 34.36 40.81 58.33
Domestic Bond Direct 10.11 9.98 10.16 11.11 9.07 12.57
Domestic Bond Fund 7.35 7.11 6.79 6.87 6.80 12.20
Domestic Bond Direct/Fund 15.19 15.08 14.92 15.66 13.70 21.26
All Stock Direct 32.57 22.71 27.80 32.55 38.42 54.17
All Stock Fund 12.72 9.86 11.85 11.93 11.58 24.11
All Stock Direct/Fund 35.86 26.15 30.96 35.26 41.73 58.63
All Bond Direct 21.54 17.87 17.94 22.59 20.93 36.83
All Bond Fund 9.74 9.40 8.21 9.22 9.38 16.37
All Bond Direct/Fund 25.00 21.35 21.75 26.23 24.07 40.72
Savings Deposit 10.94 7.59 8.74 11.59 12.52 18.26
Residential Property 63.54 49.07 56.82 66.24 73.10 84.80
Commercial Land 7.81 5.84 8.35 7.89 7.05 12.77
Paid Off Mortgage 66.47 90.05 77.62 60.55 47.32 46.69
No Other Debt 93.10 97.48 95.10 91.50 90.44 88.10
Real Estate Investment Trust 3.06 1.61 3.32 3.25 2.39 5.65
B. Household Characteristics
Size 2680 436 633 553 544 336
Average Age 50.67 54.56 51.82 48.91 48.47 50.20
Share of Married Households (%) 81.12 53.21 78.20 90.96 95.40 94.94
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Table 2.3: Share of Households Holding Assets - Employees vs Employers
All Employee vs Employer
Households Unemployed Employees Employers
A. Asset Classes (%)
Foreign Stock Direct 4.55 4.85 3.92 7.61
Foreign Stock Fund 9.85 14.12 9.22 4.15
Foreign Stock Direct/Fund 12.91 16.83 11.93 10.03
Foreign Bond Direct 14.93 17.40 14.64 11.42
Foreign Bond Fund 9.25 14.55 7.83 5.54
Foreign Bond Direct/Fund 19.51 24.68 18.55 13.84
Domestic Stock Direct 31.98 36.38 31.63 23.53
Domestic Stock Fund 11.01 15.55 10.18 5.54
Domestic Stock Direct/Fund 34.93 40.37 34.58 24.22
Domestic Bond Direct 10.11 14.39 8.86 6.94
Domestic Bond Fund 7.35 11.41 6.51 3.11
Domestic Bond Direct/Fund 15.19 22.88 13.18 8.68
All Stock Direct 32.57 36.66 32.35 24.22
All Stock Fund 12.72 17.40 11.99 6.57
All Stock Direct/Fund 35.86 40.94 35.66 25.26
All Bond Direct 21.54 26.76 20.46 15.63
All Bond Fund 9.74 15.12 8.37 5.54
All Bond Direct/Fund 25.00 32.66 23.25 17.36
Savings Deposit 10.94 16.14 9.33 8.30
Residential Property 63.54 70.29 61.14 60.42
Commercial Land 7.81 9.42 6.55 9.89
Paid Off Mortgage 66.47 81.75 59.39 70.38
No Other Debt 93.10 97.00 91.87 91.00
Real Estate Investment Trust 3.06 5.14 2.41 1.73
B. Household Characteristics
Number of Households 2680 701 1660 289
Average Age 50.67 59.52 46.49 52.85
Share of Married Households (%) 81.12 86.16 79.52 78.55
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rectly or through funds and that is higher than the 25% to 30% range in Iwaisako (2009),
reversing the downward trend in the 1990s reported in his study. Home owners account
for 63.54% of the total households, which is roughly in line with the US home ownership
of 65% in 20131. However, Iwaisako (2009) reports Japanese home ownership at 39%
to 45% during the 1990s, which is significantly lower. We do not have the historical data
and cannot explain the discrepancy. Also noteworthy is that Japanese households prefer
direct holdings over indirect holdings through funds in all financial asset categories but
foreign stocks, which is the only exception; households are twice as likely to hold foreign
stocks through funds than directly.
Table 2.1 illustrates how the level of asset is a strong predictor of the holding of every
single asset class; higher amount of total asset leads to higher asset holding, no matter
which asset it is. There is absolutely no reversal in any stock and bond category. In
comparison, income quintiles have many reversals and close values in many categories
in Table 2.2; for the three foreign stock categories where our particular interest lies, 3
reversals can be found. Also, Quintile 3, our special case in the last chapter, does not
have anything that consistently stands out; in most cases, they are less likely to hold any
asset than households with higher income. At least from Table 2.2, the 2013 data does
not show anything exceptional for Quintile 3 that can explain what we found in Chapter 1.
Table 2.3 splits households into three groups based on one dimension of occupation:
unemployed, employees, and employers. Compared to households that are made up
entirely by employees, households that have at least one employer are more likely to
directly hold foreign stocks, but their investment in every other bond or stock category is
less frequent.
Iwaisako (2009) discovers a hump-shaped age profile of stock holding in the 1990s.
But the hump is not present in 2013 data. As can be seen from Figure 2.1, except for a dip
in the 70s, the increase in asset holdings is roughly linear with age. Figure 2.2 confirms
1Source: US Bureau of the Census
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Figure 2.1: Age Profile of Asset Holding for Japanese Households
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Figure 2.2: Age Profile of Asset Holding: Home Owners vs Non-owners
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home ownership’s impact on the age profile also found in Iwaisako (2009). The age profile
of non-owners is relatively flat and close to zero whereas for homeowners it is higher and
increasing. Also, notable from both Figures 2.1 and 2.2 is how stock and bond holdings
closely follow each other; they seem to fluctuate together over different age groups.
2.5 Regression Results
Regression coefficients are recorded in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. The likelihood ratio test
statistics are calculated using Firth’s penalized likelihood.
2.5.1 Foreign and Domestic Stock Holding
Table 2.4 reports households’ decision in investing in various categories of stocks. Total
asset value is an excellent predictor of stock investing, and its impact is nicely monotonic:
higher the value, more likely to hold every kind of stock. Asset quintiles’ coefficients are
among the highest in each regression, representing the highest positive impact on stock
holdings. In comparison, income does not perform as well. It is a strong indicator only
for direct domestic stock holdings (which drives the combined “D. Stock Direct+Fund”
column). It is not significant for foreign asset holdings, direct or indirect, failing all Wald
tests2. This result supports our suspicion of income as an invalid indicator for foreign
asset holdings for Japanese households in Chapter 1. But the regression fails to pinpoint
anything special for the 3rd income quintile; we are still unclear why the median earners
exhibit the lowest sensitivity to Japan-specific shocks as shown in the last chapter.
Nechio (2014) reports that both income and total asset value are significant and posi-
tive in predicting US households’ holdings in both domestic and foreign stocks, with asset
value being the stronger predictor of the two. However, for Japanese households, income
predicts domestic stock holdings but not the foreign ones. Total asset value is a strong
2All Wald test results are available upon request.
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Table 2.4: Logit Estimation Results - Foreign and Domestic Stock Holdings
F. Stock F. Stock F. Stock D. Stock D. Stock D. Stock
Drct+Fnd Direct Fund Drct+Fnd Direct Fund
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 -0.189 -0.673* 0.254 0.301* 0.349* 0.006(0.228) (0.348) (0.260) (0.183) (0.184) (0.248)
Income Quintile 3 -0.223 -0.496 0.095 0.392** 0.494** -0.074(0.247) (0.355) (0.286) (0.199) (0.199) (0.269)
Income Quintile 4 -0.251 -0.271 0.072 0.506** 0.584*** -0.341(0.260) (0.363) (0.302) (0.208) (0.208) (0.288)
Income Quintile 5 0.031 -0.208 0.490 0.850*** 0.896*** 0.289(0.277) (0.392) (0.317) (0.228) (0.227) (0.298)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 1.178*** 0.573 1.721*** 0.710*** 0.708*** 0.775**(0.321) (0.431) (0.475) (0.169) (0.171) (0.352)
Asset Quintile 3 1.316*** 0.912** 1.826*** 0.983*** 0.837*** 1.119***(0.323) (0.432) (0.471) (0.178) (0.180) (0.339)
Asset Quintile 4 1.887*** 1.306*** 2.376*** 1.285*** 1.173*** 1.670***(0.303) (0.397) (0.453) (0.169) (0.171) (0.318)
Asset Quintile 5 2.227*** 1.695*** 2.713*** 1.771*** 1.574*** 2.158***(0.329) (0.440) (0.473) (0.210) (0.208) (0.342)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee 0.165 -0.157 0.175 -0.096 -0.125 0.233(0.219) (0.339) (0.238) (0.188) (0.185) (0.232)
Employer 0.070 0.812** -0.623** -0.489** -0.385* -0.446(0.259) (0.345) (0.321) (0.213) (0.210) (0.298)
Residential Property 0.434** 0.528* 0.361* 0.458*** 0.419*** 0.198(0.190) (0.299) (0.214) (0.137) (0.138) (0.203)
Age (household average) 0.006 -0.011 0.015 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.015*(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Gender (female) -0.157 -0.591*** 0.068 -0.481*** -0.514*** -0.114(0.140) (0.223) (0.156) (0.107) (0.107) (0.150)
Married (yes) -0.147 0.244 -0.381 -0.102 -0.093 -0.015(0.209) (0.340) (0.230) (0.163) (0.163) (0.230)
Savings Deposit 1.329*** 0.955*** 1.490*** 1.729*** 1.425*** 1.466***(0.157) (0.225) (0.168) (0.187) (0.167) (0.162)
Other Real Estate 0.074 -0.029 0.028 0.595*** 0.492*** 0.140(0.202) (0.299) (0.223) (0.184) (0.178) (0.212)
No Other Debt 0.417 0.056 0.397 -0.426** -0.371* -0.127(0.354) (0.457) (0.415) (0.206) (0.205) (0.330)
Paid Off Mortgage 0.113 0.020 0.214 -0.122 -0.123 -0.041
(0.180) (0.257) (0.208) (0.136) (0.136) (0.195)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 294.609 98.964 299.541 555.375 478.966 306.970
Degrees of Freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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predictor in stock holdings of any kind, and it is more powerful than income even when
income is significant.
Savings deposit positively and significantly predicts stock holdings of every kind with
coefficient values second only to asset quintiles, which is to be expected. One is more
likely to invest in risky assets when they have money in the bank, all else being equal.
Home ownership positively predicts all stock holding with various significance (two at
1%, one at 5%, two at 10%, and one insignificant), confirming the pattern described in
Iwaisako (2009) and our Figure 2.2. The variable "Paid Off Mortgage" which represents
that the household has no outstanding mortgage has no predictive power. On the other
hand, real estate other than home has a significant and positive effect on direct domestic
stock holding, whereas households with no other debt are less likely to directly invest in
domestic stocks.
Employer status is of particular interest in Table 2.4. As the summary statistics pointed
out in Table 2.3, if a household owns a business, it is less likely to invest in every kind of
stock except for direct holdings of foreign stocks. Guvenen (2007) argues that, in a one-
country setting, business owners shoulder heavy risks that cannot be easily diversified by
investing in stocks. We conjecture that since both their own business and domestic stocks
are exposed to domestic country-level shocks, if business owners intends to diversify, they
might invest away from domestic stocks and into foreign stocks. Although the estimate
is negative for foreign stock fund holding, direct investing better reflects the household’s
own willingness to invest abroad compared to indirect investing.
In comparison, business ownership has a different effect on US households. Nechio
(2014) reports that US households are significantly less likely to hold both domestic and
foreign stocks when they own a business, while Japanese business owners like to diversify
into foreign stocks in our results.
Age seems to only matter for domestic stock investing, with a very small impact;
households with a higher average age are more likely to invest in domestic stocks both
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directly and indirectly (significant at 10% level). Age does not have a significant impact
on foreign stock holdings. The age profiles in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are likely driven by the
age effect on domestic stocks. Again, age has a different effect for the US households
in Nechio (2014); while it is insignificant in predicting US households’ foreign stock hold-
ing, it has a small but significantly negative coefficient on US domestic stock holdings.
Japanese households headed by women have lower tendency to hold any stock directly,
while the gender of the household head is insignificant in predicting any stock holdings for
US households.
2.5.2 Foreign and Domestic Bond Holding
Compared with Table 2.4, Table 2.5 shows that the regression does a much poorer job pin-
pointing variables with predictive power in the case of bond holdings. First of all, although
asset quintiles remain the perfect predictor, none of the income quintiles is significant and
they all fail the Wald test. Home ownership, mortgage, and their interaction are as weak
as before. Employer status has consistently negative effect on every kind of bond hold-
ing, but they are too insignificant to be reliable predictors. Age is the only variable besides
asset that has significance but that is only limited to domestic bond holding.
2.5.3 All Stock and All Bond Holding
In Table 2.6, we replace the left-hand side with stock and bond variables that contain both
foreign and domestic holdings so that we can gauge the combined or contradicting effects
of the variables.
Age’s positive effect on direct domestic stock holdings dominate its negative and in-
significant effect on direct foreign stock holdings. Households with female heads are less
likely to directly hold both domestic and foreign stocks, so the combined effect on all direct
holding is unsurprisingly and significantly negative.
The significance of income variables in combined stock holding is driven by their effect
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Table 2.5: Logit Estimation Results - Foreign and Domestic Bond Holdings
F. Bond F. Bond F. Bond D. Bond D. Bond D. Bond
Drct+Fnd Direct Fund Drct+Fnd Direct Fund
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 -0.060 -0.160 -0.083 -0.049 -0.023 -0.009(0.211) (0.236) (0.258) (0.216) (0.242) (0.278)
Income Quintile 3 0.278 0.256 0.096 -0.002 0.112 -0.017(0.224) (0.244) (0.278) (0.236) (0.260) (0.304)
Income Quintile 4 -0.115 -0.051 -0.087 -0.364 -0.295 -0.179(0.241) (0.261) (0.300) (0.255) (0.285) (0.326)
Income Quintile 5 0.401 0.507* 0.287 -0.259 -0.312 0.089(0.253) (0.273) (0.316) (0.275) (0.310) (0.347)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 0.979*** 1.015*** 0.875** 0.832*** 0.715** 0.711(0.255) (0.285) (0.451) (0.310) (0.343) (0.497)
Asset Quintile 3 1.310*** 1.296*** 1.383*** 1.113*** 0.682* 1.330***(0.254) (0.284) (0.422) (0.303) (0.351) (0.454)
Asset Quintile 4 1.896*** 1.899*** 1.987*** 1.899*** 1.611*** 1.905***(0.240) (0.268) (0.398) (0.279) (0.309) (0.429)
Asset Quintile 5 2.553*** 2.455*** 2.398*** 2.603*** 2.297*** 2.377***(0.267) (0.296) (0.419) (0.303) (0.333) (0.451)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee -0.025 -0.158 0.183 0.261 0.272 0.409(0.203) (0.221) (0.238) (0.207) (0.228) (0.257)
Employer -0.258 -0.204 -0.387 -0.388 -0.034 -0.524(0.240) (0.258) (0.310) (0.262) (0.281) (0.360)
Residential Property 0.141 0.067 0.238 0.165 0.176 0.022(0.162) (0.176) (0.214) (0.177) (0.202) (0.231)
Age (household average) 0.004 -0.007 0.024** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.030***(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Gender (female) -0.033 -0.049 0.171 0.019 0.053 0.094(0.123) (0.133) (0.158) (0.134) (0.151) (0.173)
Married (yes) -0.275 -0.207 -0.289 -0.092 0.030 -0.352(0.185) (0.202) (0.233) (0.201) (0.229) (0.250)
Savings Deposit 1.503*** 1.342*** 1.256*** 1.238*** 0.921*** 1.364***(0.154) (0.154) (0.171) (0.158) (0.171) (0.182)
Other Real Estate 0.116 0.137 0.055 -0.116 -0.191 0.030(0.188) (0.197) (0.223) (0.201) (0.226) (0.242)
No Other Debt -0.007 -0.216 0.600 0.655* 0.838* 0.286(0.270) (0.279) (0.466) (0.385) (0.496) (0.469)
Paid Off Mortgage -0.149 -0.277 0.210 0.057 0.044 0.008
(0.160) (0.170) (0.215) (0.178) (0.202) (0.235)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 440.797 321.294 279.393 416.051 247.558 239.927
Degrees of Freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 2.6: Logit Estimation Results - All Stock and All Bond Holdings
All Stock All Stock All Stock All Bond All Bond All Bond
Drct+Fnd Direct Fund Drct+Fnd Direct Fund
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 0.276 0.327* 0.171 -0.125 -0.209 -0.121(0.182) (0.183) (0.239) (0.196) (0.203) (0.255)
Income Quintile 3 0.352* 0.446** 0.037 0.068 0.025 0.028(0.197) (0.198) (0.261) (0.211) (0.216) (0.275)
Income Quintile 4 0.460** 0.552*** -0.113 -0.267 -0.284 -0.096(0.206) (0.207) (0.277) (0.226) (0.231) (0.295)
Income Quintile 5 0.777*** 0.837*** 0.429 0.069 0.053 0.161(0.227) (0.226) (0.289) (0.243) (0.247) (0.313)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 0.732*** 0.705*** 1.085*** 0.874*** 0.887*** 0.629(0.168) (0.170) (0.336) (0.220) (0.234) (0.421)
Asset Quintile 3 0.993*** 0.853*** 1.241*** 1.191*** 1.122*** 1.172***(0.176) (0.179) (0.333) (0.222) (0.237) (0.388)
Asset Quintile 4 1.317*** 1.177*** 1.779*** 1.861*** 1.878*** 1.812***(0.168) (0.170) (0.314) (0.208) (0.220) (0.362)
Asset Quintile 5 1.749*** 1.560*** 2.248*** 2.596*** 2.533*** 2.242***(0.209) (0.207) (0.337) (0.241) (0.251) (0.385)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee -0.046 -0.104 0.226 0.032 0.063 0.235(0.187) (0.185) (0.223) (0.195) (0.198) (0.237)
Employer -0.459** -0.359* -0.482* -0.259 -0.167 -0.435(0.212) (0.209) (0.287) (0.229) (0.233) (0.311)
Residential Property 0.492*** 0.438*** 0.447** 0.195 0.125 0.242(0.137) (0.137) (0.197) (0.152) (0.156) (0.212)
Age (household average) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.024**(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Gender (female) -0.452*** -0.520*** -0.115 -0.036 -0.013 0.160(0.107) (0.107) (0.144) (0.117) (0.119) (0.156)
Married (yes) -0.094 -0.049 -0.205 -0.075 0.040 -0.254(0.162) (0.163) (0.216) (0.177) (0.184) (0.232)
Savings Deposit 1.750*** 1.474*** 1.529*** 1.678*** 1.384*** 1.395***(0.190) (0.169) (0.159) (0.164) (0.154) (0.168)
Other Real Estate 0.644*** 0.555*** 0.164 0.079 0.115 0.019(0.185) (0.179) (0.205) (0.185) (0.185) (0.223)
No Other Debt -0.392* -0.340* 0.077 0.231 0.040 0.679(0.206) (0.205) (0.330) (0.263) (0.264) (0.466)
Paid Off Mortgage -0.087 -0.119 0.110 -0.122 -0.197 0.133
(0.136) (0.135) (0.187) (0.151) (0.154) (0.211)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 554.883 484.887 352.778 533.774 434.156 301.459
Degrees of Freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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on direct domestic stock investing. Their predictive power on combined stock fund invest-
ing remains weak. And as shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, total asset value and savings
deposit have significant and positive effect on every asset holdings category, and they are
the most impactful based on their high estimates. Their effects on combined classes are
naturally significant and positive as well.
Home ownership is significant in positively predicting any kind of stock investing, which
is expected from all the positive coefficients in Table 2.4. But it has no power in predicting
bond holding. The effect of real estate other than home ownership on combined stock
holding likely has its source in its effect on investing directly in domestic stocks. Mortgage
and debt variables are weak as usual.
As can be seen from the coefficients of employer status in Table 2.6, its positive effect
on investing directly in foreign assets is utterly dominated by its negative effect on every
other asset class.
Results here are comparable to Campbell (2006), who uses 2001 SCF data for the US
households and without distinguishing between foreign and domestic, direct and indirect.
In Campbell’s study, age has a weak (significant at 10%) but negative effect on stock
holdings for US households, income has a weak and positive effect, and total asset value
("wealth" variable in his study) has no effect. In comparison, Japanese households from
2013 are quite different. For them, age, income, and total asset value all have strong and
positive effects on stock holdings3.
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Table 2.7: Income as the Only Predictor
F. Stock F. Stock F. Stock D. Stock D. Stock D. Stock
Drct+Fnd Direct Fund Drct+Fnd Direct Fund
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 -0.066 -0.441 0.208 0.231* 0.271* 0.068(0.195) (0.331) (0.223) (0.140) (0.146) (0.212)
Income Quintile 3 0.004 -0.098 0.113 0.437*** 0.504*** 0.126(0.199) (0.317) (0.233) (0.142) (0.147) (0.216)
Income Quintile 4 0.123 0.238 0.197 0.712*** 0.738*** 0.043(0.195) (0.298) (0.230) (0.141) (0.145) (0.220)
Income Quintile 5 0.754*** 0.643** 0.937*** 1.419*** 1.402*** 1.005***
(0.198) (0.306) (0.227) (0.156) (0.159) (0.211)
Likelihood Ratio Statistic 967.519 461.828 809.999 1626.614 1580.146 875.436
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
Table 2.8: Income as the Only Predictor - Marginal Effects
F. Stock F. Stock F. Stock D. Stock D. Stock D. Stock
Drct+Fnd Direct Fund Drct+Fnd Direct Fund
Income Quintile 2 -0.007 -0.015 0.016 0.046* 0.051* 0.006
Income Quintile 3 0.000 -0.004 0.009 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.011
Income Quintile 4 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.004
Income Quintile 5 0.103*** 0.037** 0.101*** 0.330*** 0.315*** 0.125***
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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2.6 Robustness Check
The results in Section 2.5 are all conditional estimates, but in Chapter 1, we use income
as an unconditional predictor when we divide households into quintiles and compare their
sensitivity to shocks. The first robustness check that we perform here is a logit regression
that only has income quintiles as the regressor. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that even without
any other effective regressors such as total asset and savings, income is still a poor
predictor for foreign stock holdings. Only the top earners show a significantly increased
probability of holding foreign stocks. But the evidence from Table 1.5 does not show any
increased level of consumption insurance against country-level shocks. So at least for the
households in the top income quintile, an increased probability of holding foreign stocks
does not help with hedging against country-level shocks. They might be similar to their
US counterparts who may be more exposed to their country’s economic fluctuations. On
the other hand, income in every other quintile does not provide any indication of foreign
stock participation for the Japanese households.
In addition, in order to test the robustness of our specification, we regress each de-
pendent variable on 4 sets of independent variables. Set 1 is the full set of variables that
we used in Section 2.5 and our benchmark regression. Set 2 only includes income, asset,
home ownership, and business owner, which are the core set of variables we are most
interested in. Set 3 adds to Set 2 household characteristics including age, household
head’s gender, and marital status. Set 4 adds other household finance status to Set 2,
namely savings deposit, other real estate, debt, and mortgage.
The coefficients are very robust to the change in specification for every dependent
variable, as can be shown in Tables 2.9 through 2.12. We only report foreign and domestic
3Campbell (2006) also includes risk tolerance, age squared, race, education, log income squared, and
log wealth squared as independent variables, with only education having a significantly positive effect and
risk tolerance significantly negative. Our RADAR dataset does not include education or risk tolerance
information. Income and Asset levels come as intervals so we cannot replicate log income squared or log
wealth squared. Age squared is never significant for any dependent variable so we did not include it in our
specification. Results including age squared are available upon request.
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Table 2.9: Robustness Check - Direct Foreign Stock Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 -0.673* -0.540 -0.667* -0.548(0.348) (0.343) (0.346) (0.344)
Income Quintile 3 -0.496 -0.249 -0.432 -0.315(0.355) (0.340) (0.352) (0.343)
Income Quintile 4 -0.271 0.021 -0.189 -0.069(0.363) (0.340) (0.356) (0.348)
Income Quintile 5 -0.208 0.087 -0.161 0.040(0.392) (0.357) (0.377) (0.372)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 0.573 0.579 0.582 0.572(0.431) (0.434) (0.433) (0.432)
Asset Quintile 3 0.912** 0.906** 1.020** 0.795*(0.432) (0.426) (0.431) (0.428)
Asset Quintile 4 1.306*** 1.378*** 1.473*** 1.217***(0.397) (0.375) (0.386) (0.389)
Asset Quintile 5 1.695*** 1.942*** 2.058*** 1.591***(0.440) (0.387) (0.410) (0.425)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee -0.157 -0.132 -0.189 -0.089(0.339) (0.306) (0.337) (0.308)
Employer 0.812** 0.810** 0.794** 0.840**(0.345) (0.336) (0.342) (0.337)
Residential Property 0.528* 0.617** 0.581** 0.519*(0.299) (0.268) (0.281) (0.282)
Age (household average) -0.011 -0.009(0.012) (0.012)
Gender (female) -0.591*** -0.637***(0.223) (0.222)
Married (yes) 0.244 0.246(0.340) (0.338)
Savings Deposit 0.955*** 0.979***(0.225) (0.224)
Other Real Estate -0.029 -0.072(0.299) (0.297)
No Other Debt 0.056 0.096(0.457) (0.457)
Paid Off Mortgage 0.020 -0.054
(0.257) (0.247)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 98.964 73.033 82.430 90.935
Degrees of Freedom 18 11 14 15
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 2.10: Robustness Check - Foreign Stock Holding through Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 0.254 0.162 0.266 0.138(0.260) (0.246) (0.252) (0.253)
Income Quintile 3 0.095 0.032 0.236 -0.099(0.286) (0.261) (0.276) (0.270)
Income Quintile 4 0.072 -0.028 0.218 -0.150(0.302) (0.269) (0.289) (0.282)
Income Quintile 5 0.490 0.220 0.507* 0.234(0.317) (0.275) (0.300) (0.293)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 1.721*** 1.787*** 1.721*** 1.761***(0.475) (0.477) (0.475) (0.476)
Asset Quintile 3 1.826*** 2.181*** 2.053*** 1.915***(0.471) (0.468) (0.469) (0.471)
Asset Quintile 4 2.376*** 2.844*** 2.675*** 2.475***(0.453) (0.445) (0.448) (0.453)
Asset Quintile 5 2.713*** 3.533*** 3.293*** 2.853***(0.473) (0.452) (0.459) (0.469)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee 0.175 -0.067 0.143 0.046(0.238) (0.206) (0.228) (0.215)
Employer -0.623** -0.695** -0.609** -0.677**(0.321) (0.306) (0.310) (0.317)
Residential Property 0.361* 0.447** 0.390** 0.405**(0.214) (0.186) (0.198) (0.199)
Age (household average) 0.015 0.020**(0.010) (0.009)
Gender (female) 0.068 -0.007(0.156) (0.150)
Married (yes) -0.381 -0.378*(0.230) (0.220)
Savings Deposit 1.490*** 1.500***(0.168) (0.167)
Other Real Estate 0.028 0.060(0.223) (0.222)
No Other Debt 0.397 0.349(0.415) (0.415)
Paid Off Mortgage 0.214 0.305
(0.208) (0.201)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 299.541 219.085 225.743 295.647
Degrees of Freedom 18 11 14 15
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 2.11: Robustness Check - Direct Domestic Stock Holding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 0.349* 0.388** 0.388** 0.363**(0.184) (0.175) (0.179) (0.180)
Income Quintile 3 0.494** 0.564*** 0.640*** 0.454**(0.199) (0.182) (0.193) (0.188)
Income Quintile 4 0.584*** 0.649*** 0.721*** 0.560***(0.208) (0.185) (0.199) (0.195)
Income Quintile 5 0.896*** 0.950*** 1.022*** 0.879***(0.227) (0.202) (0.215) (0.215)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 0.708*** 0.722*** 0.673*** 0.746***(0.171) (0.166) (0.168) (0.170)
Asset Quintile 3 0.837*** 0.994*** 0.920*** 0.873***(0.180) (0.169) (0.173) (0.177)
Asset Quintile 4 1.173*** 1.380*** 1.257*** 1.239***(0.171) (0.153) (0.159) (0.167)
Asset Quintile 5 1.574*** 2.033*** 1.842*** 1.682***(0.208) (0.180) (0.189) (0.202)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee -0.125 -0.428*** -0.119 -0.389**(0.185) (0.161) (0.179) (0.168)
Employer -0.385* -0.504*** -0.341* -0.527***(0.210) (0.197) (0.202) (0.205)
Residential Property 0.419*** 0.661*** 0.514*** 0.589***(0.138) (0.115) (0.123) (0.126)
Age (household average) 0.018*** 0.021***(0.006) (0.006)
Gender (female) -0.514*** -0.524***(0.107) (0.104)
Married (yes) -0.093 -0.106(0.163) (0.158)
Savings Deposit 1.425*** 1.471***(0.167) (0.166)
Other Real Estate 0.492*** 0.537***(0.178) (0.176)
No Other Debt -0.371* -0.440**(0.205) (0.204)
Paid Off Mortgage -0.123 -0.013
(0.136) (0.130)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 478.966 345.327 383.505 447.769
Degrees of Freedom 18 11 14 15
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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Table 2.12: Robustness Check - Domestic Stock Holding through Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income (lowest as base)
Income Quintile 2 0.006 0.054 0.051 -0.006(0.248) (0.234) (0.239) (0.242)
Income Quintile 3 -0.074 0.012 0.060 -0.120(0.269) (0.247) (0.258) (0.255)
Income Quintile 4 -0.341 -0.183 -0.125 -0.390(0.288) (0.259) (0.274) (0.272)
Income Quintile 5 0.289 0.324 0.410 0.222(0.298) (0.259) (0.280) (0.278)
Asset (lowest as base)
Asset Quintile 2 0.775** 0.828** 0.770** 0.817**(0.352) (0.351) (0.351) (0.352)
Asset Quintile 3 1.119*** 1.403*** 1.299*** 1.188***(0.339) (0.331) (0.333) (0.337)
Asset Quintile 4 1.670*** 2.019*** 1.875*** 1.757***(0.318) (0.302) (0.307) (0.315)
Asset Quintile 5 2.158*** 2.765*** 2.562*** 2.280***(0.342) (0.311) (0.321) (0.337)
Employer vs Employee (unemployed as base)
Employee 0.233 -0.041 0.201 0.051(0.232) (0.201) (0.221) (0.210)
Employer -0.446 -0.531* -0.411 -0.539*(0.298) (0.284) (0.286) (0.295)
Residential Property 0.198 0.445*** 0.306* 0.321*(0.203) (0.176) (0.187) (0.189)
Age (household average) 0.015* 0.019**(0.009) (0.008)
Gender (female) -0.114 -0.191(0.150) (0.145)
Married (yes) -0.015 0.013(0.230) (0.221)
Savings Deposit 1.466*** 1.495***(0.162) (0.162)
Other Real Estate 0.140 0.171(0.212) (0.211)
No Other Debt -0.127 -0.171(0.330) (0.330)
Paid Off Mortgage -0.041 0.047
(0.195) (0.188)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 306.970 221.587 227.979 304.396
Degrees of Freedom 18 11 14 15
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses
*, **, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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stock holdings both directly and through funds. Checks on other assets are available from
the author.
In Table 2.9, income levels are powerless in predicting direct foreign stock holding in all
specifications. Total asset value’s coefficients, on the other hand, are monotonically and
significantly positive. The coefficient of employer status shows minimal changes across
specifications and is always significant, suggesting its orthogonality with both household
characteristic and other finance variables. The increased standard error of home owner-
ship’s coefficient suggests multicollinearity with one of the other finance variables. Among
the non-core variables, the gender of the household head and savings deposit both show
the same effect and significance.
The comparison between coefficients of core variables is roughly the same in Tables
2.10, 2.11, and 2.12. Total asset value is always an excellent predictor. Income is only
useful in predicting holding domestic stocks directly. Home ownership sees increased
standard error due to multicollinearity and possibly lose some significance. But the bottom
line is the same, the significant predictors discovered in Section 2.5 are robust across the
different specifications.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
We apply a logit model on Radar 2013 data and confirm that income is not significantly
related to foreign stock holdings for Japanese households. We also discover that total
asset value and savings deposit are significant predictors for any kind of asset holdings.
Iwaisako (2009) documents the importance of home ownership in portfolio decision and
our analysis confirms that. A new discovery is made about business owners’ preference
in stock investing. They tend to engage in more direct foreign stock investing and less
domestic stock investing. We suspect that it is because both their business and domestic
stocks are exposed to domestic macro shocks, which agrees with Guvenen (2007). Busi-
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ness owners who seek to diversify from country-level shocks are more willing to invest in
foreign stocks.
This study is only a snapshot of Japanese households’ asset holding decision in one
year, 2013, so many important questions are left unanswered. For example, we are not
certain how representative the year we used in this study is for Japanese households
throughout history; there are patterns in Chapter 1 that cannot be explained by our 2013
RADAR data. Also, we do not know the asset participation pattern and its change over
time. Future studies are needed to answer these questions.
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Chapter 3
Out-of-Range Exchange Rate
Pass-Through: a Test of Multi-Country
Effect
Abstract
Previous studies on exporters’ pricing-to-market behavior have significant estimates
that are out of the reasonable range; when an exporter’s home currency appreciates
by, say, 10%, the exporter can be found to adjust its selling price in foreign markets up
by more than 10% in some cases, and down in others. Based on the latest theoretical
development in the exchange rate pass-through literature, I test if the estimates are
improved when competition from exporters from competing countries is controlled for.
With imperfect measure in the control for competition, many out-of-range estimates
disappear. Exporters in different industries respond to competitor’s exchange rate
shocks differently, with those who produce more homogeneous goods more likely to
have a negative estimate.
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3.1 Introduction
Under the assumption of the Law of One Price (LOP), if a manufacturer sells its products
in both domestic and foreign markets, the price in the foreign market would change ac-
cordingly when the exchange rate between the two countries fluctuates. Krugman (1986)
documents a phenomenon that exporters typically absorb at least a part of the exchange
rate shock in an effort to maintain a relatively steady price in the importing country. He
calls this a pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior1. The discovery of such a behavior inspired
an entire PTM literature, which uses exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to measure the
magnitude of PTM. Various theories2 have been proposed to explain the PTM behavior,
but curiously none of them address a seemingly abnormal pattern shown by the most
frequently cited empirical work by Knetter (1993) that a large number of exporter-industry
pairs have an ERPT estimate outside the theoretically reasonable range: some estimates
indicate that the exporter absorb more than 100% of exchange rate shock in their markup
while others imply that the exporter totally discard the exchange rate shock and move
towards the opposite direction in pricing. Dornbusch (1987) is one the earliest effort in
looking into competitors’ role in exporters’ pricing decisions. In the theoretical work of
Naknoi (2015), it is suggested that exporters not only respond to the change in exchange
rate between themselves and the destination countries, but they are also influenced by
other exporters selling the same product in the same market. This chapter first replicates
Knetter (1993)’s result with more recent data and investigate the existence of out-of-range
ERPT estimates. We then attempt to contribute to the literature by testing whether the es-
timation can be improved when competitors are introduced in the regression. Our results
show that in the original two-country setup, out-of-range estimates do exist and many
are significant. When competitors’ exchange rates are controlled for, the statistical sig-
1More broadly, PTM can refer to a practice of price discrimination of which contracts are market specific.
Such contracts may involve currency of denomination, delivery services, etc. In this chapter, we refer to
PTM in a narrow sense in the context of exchange rate pass-through.
2Feenstra (1989), Marston (1990), Wei and Parsley (1995), Devereux and Engel (2003), etc.
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nificance in most cases disappear. Competitors’ impact on exporters’ pricing decision is
shown to be significant in many cases and there is a pattern that exporters of homoge-
neous goods tend to respond to competitors’ exchange rate shocks negatively whereas
car exporters lean towards the opposite.
A brief review of the ERPT and PTM literature is included in Section 3.2. We choose
to use the estimation method of Knetter (1993), and modify it according to Naknoi (2015).
We take the exporter’s point of view, structuring a panel of multiple importing countries per
industry per exporter, and use a time fixed-effect regression to obtain our results. Naknoi
(2015) empirically tests one country, Canada, as the exporter and includes the US as the
only importer, taking into account all competing exporters. Our study expands to three
exporters (US, UK, and Germany) and include every destination country that imports as
least 1% of the total exports from its exporting partners. This approach is different from
the empirical approach of Bergin and Feenstra (2009), a relevant work to our study that
focuses on the effect of competing exporters on ERPT. Although they also consider com-
petition’s effect on ERPT, their primary focus is on the impact of one fixed-exchange-rate
competitor’s market share on the ERPT of a floating-rate exporter. Section 3.3 explains
the data in detail. Section 3.4 presents the results and discussion. As the first step we
run exactly the same regression as Knetter (1993) on our new, more recent dataset and
compare it to Knetter (1993). A second regression is then carried out using the model
proposed by Naknoi (2015). Given the current data and its limitations, we cannot say that
the out-of-range issue is conclusively resolved by the introduction of competitors in the
regression. But there is evidence that supports the significant importance of competition
from other exporters. We conclude in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Literature and Estimation Method
The numerous studies of prices and exchange rates invariably have their origin in the
concept of the LOP, which is formally expressed as
Px = Pm/Exm (3.1)
where Px is the price at which the exporter sells its product in its own country, denomi-
nated in the exporter’s currency, and Pm is the import price denominated in importer or
buyer’s currency. Exm is the exchange rate between the seller and the buyer, expressed
as the number of importer’s currencies per exporter’s currency3. If Px remains relatively
stable within a short period of time, under the LOP, one would expect Pm to respond
positively to Exm.
In reality, although the LOP might hold for a few cases, such as precious metal, this
law is almost always rejected by empirical studies4. The reason might be imperfect com-
petition, costly arbitrage, and location-specific characteristics of the product, just to name
a few. One of the most typical examples is automobile industry. The transportation cost
of automobiles is significant, making it costly for arbitrage. Additionally, regulations vary
from country to country, therefore differences, though perhaps minor, exist between the
Honda Accords sold in the US and those in Germany. Also, services which are a big part
of car purchase decision making are provided locally.
Cases like these are seen as evidence against the LOP and, further, against perfect
competition and a fully integrated international market. Furthermore, the PTM behavior
discovered by Krugman (1986) seems prevalent and inspired many studies to follow. The
importance of PTM can be felt by both the importers and the exporters. From an importer’s
standpoint, it studies whether or how inflation of one country can find its way to that of
3From the exporter’s standpoint, Exm is a direct quote.
4Giovannini (1988) and Rogoff (1996)
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another. And for exporters, PTM can reduce or boost their profit margin, depending on
the direction of the exchange rate change and how they typically respond to that change.
In the literature of ERPT and PTM, exporters’ pricing behavior is composed of two
parts, the marginal cost and the mark-up, with the latter subject to changes in the face
of an exchange rate shock. The generic form of the regression specification has the
following form:
∆pk,t = θk,t + βk∆ek,t + k,t (3.2)
where p can be the log of either import or export prices and e is the exchange rate between
two trading partners. t indexes time and k indexes the trading partners. θk,t is the (noisy)
control for changes in marginal cost over time and βk, the ERPT, is what ultimately tells
us how much exchange rate changes are passed through prices.
There are no set standards in the literature in regard to using whether import prices
or export prices for p or direct quote or indirect quote for e, the estimated βk might take
different values while meaning the same thing. Table 3.1 can help us translate different
studies into the same language, with the third column listing the theoretical range in each
case.
Table 3.1: Regression Estimate Ranges and Interpretations
P E β range Full PTM No PTMNo pass-through Complete pass-through
In importer # of im. cur. [0, 1] β = 0 β = 1
currency per ex. cur.
In importer # of ex. cur.
[−1, 0] β = 0 β = −1currency per im. cur.
In exporter # of im. cur.
[−1, 0] β = −1 β = 0currency per ex. cur.
In exporter # of ex. cur. [0, 1] β = 1 β = 0
currency per im. cur.
Many studies have been dedicated to this issue starting from the 1980s. The early
studies, such as Hooper and Mann (1989) and Melick (1989), focus on analyzing the
pass-through into US import prices. A serious empirical challenge in the literature is
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controlling of the marginal cost θk,t in Equation (3.2). Cost indices are commonly used.
But as pointed out by Goldberg and Knetter (1997), this is problematic since they are
measures of average cost instead of marginal cost which is what really affects the pricing
behavior. Recent studies, such as Bergin and Feenstra (2009), focus on ERPT into import
prices rely heavily on the cost structure assumed in various theoretical frameworks.
Starting from Feenstra (1989), there has been a clear shift in the literature to focusing
on the industry level, which was itself a response and adaption to the rising imperfect com-
petition theory during that period. Knetter (1993) explores taking on the angle of a single
exporter selling its product to a variety of destinations over time and hereby mitigates the
marginal cost issue; unlike in the import price analysis where different exporters have dif-
ferent marginal costs, now we can safely assume the one exporter’s marginal cost is the
same across all destinations. So the subscript k can be dropped from θ turning Equation
(3.2) into
∆pk,t = θt + βk∆ek,t + k,t (3.3)
With a panel of a source country exporting to various destinations, a time-fixed effect
regression can be used to estimate both θt and βk, avoiding the marginal cost issue faced
by the import pricing analysis.
Knetter (1993) uses his regression results from 52 exporter-industry pairs to show that
from all four exporters he studied, the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK, the majority of
industries show a strong PTM behavior. Another finding was that out of the 52 exporter-
industry pairs, only eight can reject the null hypothesis that ERPT estimate of β is the
same across all destinations. In other words, in most cases, a single exporter does not
differentiate between destinations when adjusting its mark-up in response to exchange
rate changes. This is a significant finding as now we can further drop the subscript k for
the β in the regression equation and turn it into a pooled OLS with year dummies
∆pk,t = θt + β∆ek,t + k,t (3.4)
54
which further reduces the computational complexity of the regression.
Although the change of angle and the improvement of methodology have made Knetter
(1993) one of the most influential and best received empirical studies in the PTM literature,
one singularity seems to have failed to raise the curiosity it deserves in later studies. As
mentioned before, Knetter (1993) chooses the exporter’s currency as the denomination
of prices and the exchange rates are expressed as the number of importer currency per
exporter currency. According to Table 3.1, β is supposed to lie in the theoretical range
of [-1, 0]. But two out of 18 German exporting industries have an estimated β outside of
the range and it gets even worse with other countries: five out of 14 for Japan, four out
of nine for the UK, and seven out of 11 for the US. The highest out-of-range estimate is
1.73, while the lowest is -2.26. Under a two-country setup, why would an exporter pass
more than 100% exchange rate shock into the prices? Why would another exporter move
to the other direction in face of exchange rate shocks, i.e. lowering their local prices when
their currency appreciates? Knetter (1993) does not provide any explanation for this and
no later research addresses this issue.
The problem probably lies in the two-country setup, which assumes that exporters
respond only to the exchange rate between themselves and the importers. In reality,
exporters have to consider competing exporters in their pricing. Bergin and Feenstra
(2009) is one step towards addressing this by introducing competition among exporters
into the model. But the theory was restricted to a scenario with a fixed exchange rate
exporter vs a floating exchange rate exporter. Naknoi (2015) develops a more general
model and suggests a regression equation by adding exchange rates from countries other
than the exporter-importer pair into Equation (3.4) in order to pick up the competition from
other exporters.
∆pkx,t = θt + βx1∆ekx,t + βx2
∑
h6=x
Ch,tEkh,t
Cx,tEkx,t
∆ekh,t + x,t (3.5)
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where x represents the exporter whose point of view we take and h’s are its competitors
also selling to importing country k. Cx,t is the marginal cost of the exporting firms and Ch,t
is that of country h’s. Ekh,t and Ekx,t serve to convert the marginal costs into the same
importer k’s currency.
With international exchange rate changes often correlated, estimated β from Equation
(3.4) is essentially a biased estimator of βx2 in Equation (3.5). And since the correlation
between exchange rate changes can be positive and negative, both upward and down-
ward biases are possible, which can explain out-of-range estimates that are too big and
too small. With competition from other exporters accounted for and controlled for with
βx2, βx1 should fall in the much studied and believed theoretical range of [-1, 0]. βx1 is the
original ERPT that measure the impact of changes in the exporter’s own exchange rate,
and can be named self-ERPT in contrast to βx2, which is the common factor of the com-
petitors’ cross-ERPT. Naknoi (2015) shows that if the importer’s demand for competitor’s
products is elastic, βx2 would take a positive value. Consider the case in which the US
exporters sell in the Japanese market, with the UK exporters being their major competi-
tors. When the British pound appreciates against the yen, assuming at least a part of the
exchange rate shock is passed through the price of UK exports, with an elastic demand
from the importer, the residual demand faced by the US exporter would increase, giving
them an advantage and room to raise their own export price, implying a positive βx2. Con-
versely, when the pound depreciates, the UK exports become more competitive in pricing,
squeezing the residual demand for the US exporters, again indicating a positive estimate.
The empirical portion of Naknoi (2015) only includes Canada as the only main exporter
and the US as the only importer, taking into account of competing exporters, from 1990
to 2009. This study incorporates three main exporters (US, UK, and Germany) and every
major importer they export to from 1991 to 2016.
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3.3 Data
The trade data used in this study is compiled from the UN COMTRADE database through
the World Bank’s WITS system. We obtain the export unit price series from the annual
freight-on-board (FOB) export value and quantity for these exporters: 19 industries in the
US, 18 in the UK, and 19 in Germany. The choice of exporters comes from the motivation
to replicate the results of Knetter (1993). However, as Japan persistently manages its
exchange rate, we exclude it from our choice of exporting countries. It is important to
note that Knetter (1993) does not disclose his choice of destination countries for any of
the exporters, and a request for his dataset remains unanswered. Therefore, we have
to come up with our own criterion for destination selection. In this study, an importer is
selected if it accounts for at least 1% of the total value of exports from the exporter in this
industry. And all the selected importers combined should cover at least 80% of industry-
specific exports from the exporting country. Otherwise, we go on and include the next
importer in line. This importer selection procedure explains the majority of the variation in
sample sizes across industries. It should be noted that the difference between Knetter’s
results and the estimation from our dataset might be due to the selection of destinations.
Our importer selection is also different from that of Naknoi (2015), in which only the US is
considered as the importing country.
The sample periods for all three exporters are from 1991 to 2016. But for some indus-
tries from German and UK exporters such as car industries, quantities were first reported
in kilograms before 2000, then in units since. Since car price per kilogram is hardly sen-
sible and a change in unit renders price growth nonsensical, entries before 2000 are
dropped for those industries5. In order to achieve uniformity, the UN COMTRADE records
all values in US dollar (USD) and that includes export data from non-US exporters. For
5The HS codes for the truncated industries are: 870321, 870322, 870323, 870324, 870333, 880240 for
Germany and 270900, 840734, 841112, 847120, 847191, 854211, 870321, 870322, 870323, 870324 for
UK.
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countries that report in other currencies, they convert the annual values into USD using a
specially calculated “currency conversion factor”, which is the average monthly exchange
rate between the reporting currency and USD weighted by “relevant” monthly trade which
is not disclosed. However, the conversion factors are disclosed so we can use them to
convert the USD values into their respective currencies except for the case of Germany.
Germany’s export data are inconsistent due to this practice. The data for some years are
reported in Deutsche Marks (DEM) and later euros (EUR), while for some years they are
reported in USD, presumably using an exchange rate by the German reporting agency
that is different from the currency conversion factor used in the DEM and EUR years. In
our estimation, we need to use the conversion factor for some years and the exchange
rate for others in the same time series which might cause errors. One needs to take
caution when drawing inferences from the estimates for Germany.
One advantage of our dataset over that in Knetter (1993) is Harmonized System (HS)
classification, which allows us to compare the same industry from different exporters using
the same classification and measure. We use HS1988/1992 (HS0) as it is the oldest
HS system and has the longest available time period. But this also introduces possible
discrepancy from Knetter (1993) as his dataset uses anything but HS, and some of the
categorizations are no longer in use. For example, in Knetter (1993) the US differentiates
automobiles with cylinder count, whereas in all HS categorizations displacement is used
as the main difference. Even if we match his results with the same industry names, the
measurement practice might still be different.
As for the selection of industries, apart from trying to match Knetter’s work, we also
include at least ten 6-digit industries that have the largest country-specific value of total
exports in the chosen time period, given the availability of the data.
Exchange rates are obtained from the World Bank database. Exchange rates for cur-
rencies of euro-zone countries are available before the countries adopted the euro. We
stick to their original currency even after they joined the euro-zone and manually calculate
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the exchange rates for the original currency using the euro’s exchange rates and the fixed
rate, also from the World Bank database, between the euro and the original currency at
the time of each country’s euro adoption.
3.4 Estimation Results
Table 3.2: Estimated ERPT Elasticity for US Exports
Industry HS Code ERPT (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Seeds 100190 0.049*** (0.016) 0.73 457
Maize 100590 0.161*** (0.059) 0.21 345
Soybeans 120100 -0.625 (0.347) 0.23 270
Gasoline 271000 -0.005 (0.089) 0.88 314
Aluminum oxide 281810 0.026 (0.238) 0.33 268
Titanium oxide 282300 0.003 (0.020) 0.15 319
Non-monetary gold 710812 0.310*** (0.063) 0.27 214
Aluminum foil 760711 -0.064 (0.039) 0.17 245
Computers 847120 -0.030 (0.064) 0.27 500
CPU 847191 -0.042*** (0.014) 0.48 373
Air coolers and purifiers 847989 0.062* (0.036) 0.40 230
Integrated circuits, digital 854211 -0.427*** (0.155) 0.32 301
Integrated circuits, other 854219 0.080** (0.040) 0.20 315
Cars under 1L 870321 0.143*** (0.055) 0.09 490
Cars 1L to 1.5L 870322 -0.045 (0.039) 0.07 275
Cars 1.5L to 3L 870323 -0.150** (0.069) 0.15 249
Cars over 3L 870324 0.143** (0.057) 0.30 273
Airplanes over 15 tons 880240 0.080 (0.075) 0.27 371
Aircraft parts 880330 0.095 (0.137) 0.28 348
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant.
Tables 3.2 to 3.4 are the results from the estimation of the panel data described in
the last section using Equation (3.4). Equation (3.3) is also estimated, but the F-tests
show that there is no significant difference between different importers’ ERPT’s from the
same exporter, so the results are not shown here6. In the third column where ERPT
6The estimates for Equation (3.3) and the F-tests between models of Equation (3.3) and Equation (3.4)
are available upon request.
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Table 3.3: Estimated ERPT Elasticity for UK Exports
Industry HS Code ERPT (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Whiskeys 220830 -0.113*** (0.024) 0.71 529
Crude oil from bituminous† 270900 0.055 (0.041) 0.14 140
Gasoline 271000 -0.096 (0.137) 0.60 191
Medicine 300490 -0.055 (0.148) 0.13 385
Books 490199 -0.033 (0.112) 0.08 523
Car engines† 840734 0.641 (0.508) 0.16 205
Turbo-jets† 841112 0.275*** (0.070) 0.07 205
Turbo-jet parts 841191 -0.067 (0.377) 0.13 322
Computers† 847120 -3.291*** (0.885) 0.13 303
CPU† 847191 -0.650 (0.665) 0.21 304
Computer accessories 847330 -0.359 (0.358) 0.20 408
Switches 853650 -0.218 (0.236) 0.08 499
Integrated circuits, digital† 854211 -0.029 (0.023) 0.37 239
Cars under 1L† 870321 0.239** (0.093) 0.20 176
Cars 1L to 1.5L† 870322 0.375 (0.248) 0.10 316
Cars 1.5L to 3L† 870323 -0.053 (0.249) 0.10 336
Cars over 3L† 870324 -0.457** (0.180) 0.20 240
Motor vehicle parts 870899 0.064 (0.059) 0.13 454
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant.
†indicates industries with a time period from 2000 to 2016.
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Table 3.4: Estimated ERPT Elasticity for German Exports
Industry HS Code ERPT (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Beers 220300 -0.178 (0.134) 0.10 376
Gasoline 271000 -0.250** (0.106) 0.67 266
Aluminum oxide 281810 -0.135* (0.075) 0.08 507
Antisera 300210 -0.292 (0.249) 0.54 409
Medicine 300490 -0.271** (0.107) 0.86 511
Chemical products, other 382390 -0.032*** (0.011) 0.11 567
Engine parts 840991 0.018 (0.038) 0.04 499
Diesel engines 840999 -0.049** (0.020) 0.05 499
Panels 853710 -0.030*** (0.010) 0.06 618
Cars under 1L† 870321 0.538* (0.310) 0.93 248
Cars 1L to 1.5L† 870322 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 338
Cars 1.5L to 3L† 870323 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 272
Cars over 3L† 870324 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 240
Diesel cars over 2.5L† 870333 -0.003 (0.006) 1.00 288
Parts for special purpose vehicles 870829 -0.054 (0.039) 0.09 506
Car transmission 870840 -0.026 (0.026) 0.11 590
Motor vehicle parts 870899 -0.052** (0.025) 0.13 562
Aircrafts over 15 tons† 880240 0.020 (0.096) 0.92 166
Aircraft parts 880330 -0.400 (0.261) 0.25 168
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant
†indicates industries with a time period from 2000 to 2016.
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estimates are given, statistical significance is from a two-tailed test due to the existence
of positive ERPT’s. An italic number means this estimate lies out of the [-1, 0] theoretical
range, whereas a bold number is both out of range and significant. As Equation (3.4)
is essentially an OLS with year dummies, the standard errors in Tables 3.2 to 3.4 are
clustered by importing countries.
In terms of the overall magnitude of the PTM behavior, for each country’s top exporting
industries, Germany exhibits the greatest number of PTM leaning industries, with seven
out of 19 industries demonstrating a significant tendency of absorbing at least a part of the
exchange rate shocks to maintain stable local prices. Three out of 19 US top industries
demonstrate strong PTM behavior, compared to two out of 18 UK industries. Knetter
(1993) concludes that the UK, as a relatively weaker competitor in international trade
compared to the US and Germany, should demonstrate stronger tendency towards PTM
to maintain a stable foreign pricing. We cannot find support in our data.
Out of the 19 US exporting industries, 11 are out of range, seven of which are sig-
nificant. The significant out of range estimates are all positive, indicating that for the US
seed, maize, gold, air cooler, non-digital circuits, small cars, and large cars exporters,
when the USD appreciates, instead of lowering their exporting USD price to maintain a
relative stable local price, they actually increase it, exacerbating the local price increase
denominated in the importer’s currency. In the case of the UK exporters, seven out of
18 are out of range, three of which are significant; for the UK turbo jet and small car ex-
porters, when the British pound (GBP) appreciates, they would increase the GBP prices
they charge the importers. On the other hand, the UK computer exporters lower their ex-
port prices more than the magnitude of any GBP appreciation, which significantly reduces
their mark-up and profit. German exporters, in comparison, are the most "normal", with
only one, the small car exporters, out of 19 industries have out-of-range estimate. In a
two-country setup where exporters are implied as the only seller in the importer market,
it is difficult to explain such behaviors.
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When we move on to estimate Equation (3.5), an immediate difficulty arises. The
marginal costs of the main exporting country and its competitors are not observed. One
might be tempted to use Producer Price Indices (PPI) for the exporting countries, which
have two problems. First, the theory requires industry-level costs, which cannot be ad-
equately represented by the available country-level PPI’s. Secondly, as mentioned in
Section 3.2, Goldberg and Knetter (1997) argue that PPI’s are average costs instead of
the marginal costs needed in our estimation.
Naknoi (2015) argues that if all exporters have the same own-price elasticity, relative
market shares are determined by the relative marginal costs, therefore we can approxi-
mate the relative cost term Ch,tEkh,t
Cx,tEkx,t
by the relative market share and turn Equation (3.5)
into
∆pkx,t = θt + βx1∆ekx,t + βx2
∑
h6=x
Mkh,t
Mkx,t
∆ekh,t + x,t (3.6)
where Mkx,t is the exporter x’s share in importer k’s market, and Mhx,t the market share
of x’s competitor h. Intuitively, the second regressor is the average of all competitors’
exchange rate growth, weighted by their importance in the importing country, measured
by their relative market share. In practice, we choose the 25 countries7 with the highest
global aggregate export excluding Belgium due to its reporting inconsistencies.
Table 3.5 reports the estimates of βx1 and βx2 in Equation (3.6) for US exporting in-
dustries. Out of the seven industries significantly out of range in Table 3.2, four lose their
statistical significance, and one switches to significantly in-range, Two industries, seed
and air cooler, remain significantly out-of-range while large airplane exporters switch from
in-range to out-of-range with the inclusion of competitors. Explanatory power is generally
improved, reflected by increased R-squares. Curiously, the seed industry’s self-ERPT is
even more positive. Currently, we could not provide any explanation and future study is
7The countries are (from highest to lowest in aggregate export value from 1991 to 2016) Germany, the
US, China, Japan, France, the UK, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, South Korea, Singapore, Russia, Spain,
Mexico, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Australia, Brazil, Sweden, Thailand, India, Indonesia, and
Poland.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Self- and Cross-ERPT’s for US Exports
Industry HS Code Self (Std. Err.) Cross (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Seeds 100190 0.067*** (0.009) 0.001 (0.002) 0.73 424
Maize 100590 -0.117 (0.170) -0.032*** (0.001) 0.38 317
Soybeans 120100 -0.018 (0.024) 0.014 (0.010) 0.87 252
Gasoline 271000 0.008 (0.089) -0.004 (0.011) 0.88 314
Aluminum oxide 281810 0.051 (0.158) -0.087 (0.073) 0.37 246
Titanium oxide 282300 -0.020 (0.032) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.17 293
Non-monetary gold 710812 0.169 (0.396) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.24 200
Aluminum foil 760711 -0.218*** (0.079) 0.004 (0.004) 0.17 226
Computers 847120 0.006 (0.088) 0.010 (0.012) 0.27 460
CPU 847191 0.133 (0.090) -0.003 (0.047) 0.48 342
Air coolers and purifiers 847989 0.547** (0.243) 0.104** (0.048) 0.42 231
Integrated circuits, digital 854211 -0.570** (0.239) -0.054*** (0.012) 0.37 274
Integrated circuits, other 854219 0.189 (0.524) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.20 289
Cars under 1L 870321 -0.289* (0.175) 0.000 (0.000) 0.08 452
Cars 1L to 1.5L 870322 -0.193 (0.283) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.15 253
Cars 1.5L to 3L 870323 -0.068 (0.071) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.15 229
Cars over 3L 870324 0.185 (0.160) -0.002 (0.003) 0.36 253
Airplanes over 15 tons 880240 0.134* (0.074) -0.211* (0.126) 0.30 333
Aircraft parts 880330 0.092 (0.139) 0.001 (0.002) 0.28 348
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant.
needed to resolve this issue. The cross-ERPT estimates are significant in nine out of
nineteen industries, four of which are positive, implying an elastic importer demand, while
the remaining five negative βx2 estimates indicate the opposite is true for those industries.
The estimation with the inclusion of competition for UK exporting industries is shown
in Table 3.6. Out of the three industries originally with out-of-range ERPT’s, turbo jet
and small car exporters now have insignificant self-ERPT’s, whereas CPU exporters now
exhibit significant and in-range PTM behavior. Half of the six significant cross-ERPT esti-
mates indicate an inelastic importer demand for the competitor’s product.
In the case of German exporters, out-of-range industry switched from small car mak-
ers to engine manufactures with the inclusion of competition in the estimation. In Table
3.7, four out of the six significant cross-ERPT estimates indicate elastic demand for com-
petitor’s exports.
In general, many exporting industries respond strongly to competitors’ exchange rate
shocks, although in different directions. Car industries mostly have a positive or insignif-
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Table 3.6: Estimated Self- and Cross-ERPT’s for UK Exports
Industry HS Code Self (Std. Err.) Cross (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Whiskeys 220830 0.184 (0.143) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.24 355
Crude oil from bituminous† 270900 -3.080 (2.738) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.35 54
Gasoline 271000 -0.163 (0.166) -0.015*** (0.001) 0.82 223
Medicine 300490 -0.254 (0.226) 0.044 (0.081) 0.88 431
Books 490199 -0.083 (0.065) 0.007 (0.014) 0.16 339
Car engines† 840734 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 238
Turbo-jets† 841112 0.011 (0.015) 0.000 (0.001) 1.00 100
Turbo-jet parts 841191 -0.833 (0.860) 0.004 (0.006) 0.12 244
Computers† 847120 -0.006 (0.009) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.99 320
CPU† 847191 -0.224*** (0.084) -0.005 (0.006) 0.92 102
Computer accessories 847330 -0.267 (0.203) -0.005 (0.006) 0.14 454
Switches 853650 -0.115** (0.058) -0.023 (0.016) 0.35 569
Integrated circuits, digital† 854211 0.281 (0.323) 0.001 (0.011) 0.80 63
Cars under 1L† 870321 0.119 (0.112) 0.000* (0.000) 0.84 249
Cars 1L to 1.5L† 870322 0.004 (0.006) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.99 344
Cars 1.5L to 3L† 870323 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 272
Cars over 3L† 870324 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 240
Motor vehicle parts 870899 -0.008 (0.035) -0.005 (0.004) 0.37 454
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant.
†indicates industries with a time period from 2000 to 2016.
Table 3.7: Estimated Self- and Cross-ERPT’s for German Exports
Industry HS Code Self (Std. Err.) Cross (Std. Err.) R Sqrd. No. Obs.
Beers 220300 -0.062 (0.052) -0.004 (0.002) 0.06 316
Gasoline 271000 -0.163 (0.164) -0.015*** (0.001) 0.83 226
Aluminum oxide 281810 -0.320* (0.185) 0.002 (0.015) 0.10 427
Antisera 300210 0.076 (0.374) -0.043 (0.106) 0.64 339
Medicine 300490 -0.254 (0.226) 0.044 (0.081) 0.88 431
Chemical products, other 382390 -0.124*** (0.042) 0.009 (0.017) 0.11 477
Engine parts 840991 0.063* (0.036) 0.007*** (0.003) 0.07 391
Diesel engines 840999 0.184 (0.112) -0.024 (0.025) 0.05 414
Panels 853710 -0.028 (0.034) -0.002 (0.010) 0.06 523
Cars under 1L† 870321 0.089 (0.087) 0.000 (0.000) 0.89 248
Cars 1L to 1.5L† 870322 0.003 (0.006) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.99 344
Cars 1.5L to 3L† 870323 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 272
Cars over 3L† 870324 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.00 240
Diesel cars over 2.5L† 870333 0.006 (0.004) -0.002** (0.001) 1.00 272
Spcl. prps. vehicle parts 870829 -0.051 (0.125) 0.009 (0.024) 0.08 431
Car transmission 870840 -0.075 (0.087) 0.008* (0.004) 0.09 500
Motor vehicle parts 870899 -0.008 (0.035) -0.005 (0.004) 0.12 454
Aircrafts over 15 tons† 880240 0.126 (0.132) 0.007 (0.020) 0.92 167
Aircraft parts 880330 -0.599 (0.611) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.28 138
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for two-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Italic entries are out of the expected [-1, 0] range.
Bold entries are both out of range and significant.
†indicates industries with a time period from 2000 to 2016.
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icant response to exchange rate shocks from the competitors, as proposed in Naknoi
(2015), whereas more homogeneous products, such as maize, gasoline, circuits, alcohol,
and computers tend to have negative estimates.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the self- and cross-ERPT for exporters from three countries (the US,
the UK, and Germany) from 1991 to 2016. We select 19, 18, and 19 industries for the
exporting countries respectively based on their importance and in attempt to replicate the
result of Knetter (1993). Importing countries are selected based on their importance to
the exporters, and the 25 countries with the highest global aggregate export excluding
Belgium are included as the competitors to the exporters.
Our evidence confirms the existence of out-of-range estimates in the two-country
setup, many of which are significant. With the introduction of competitors’ exchange rate
shocks, most of the significance disappears. But there are two instances where originally
in-range ERPT’s move out-of-range with the control of competition. Further research is
needed to investigate such a pattern.
The evidence also confirms the competitors’ impact on exporters’ pricing decisions;
many exporters respond significantly to competitors’ exchange rate changes. Industries
of more homogeneous goods tend to have negative responses whereas car industries
typically respond positively. The relationship between the direction of response and the
market structure can be further investigated in later studies.
It is worth noting the limitations of this study. The application of the relative market
share as a proxy for relative marginal costs from competing exporters is the result of
the unavailability of marginal cost data. One needs to keep in mind this issue when
interpreting the evidence and future studies are needed to resolve this obstacle.
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